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1 
PREFACE 
Identity is hardly a new issue – in fact, we have centuries of experience of face-to-face identity 
management. What is new in the Information Society is the digitalisation of identity management, 
both on the Internet and via offline databases. Authenticating onto systems, connecting to mobile 
networks and providing identity data to access services has become something we do several times a 
day. What is disruptive is that digital technologies fundamentally alter and upset the ways identity is 
managed, by people, companies and governments. One crucial question lies at the heart of digital 
identity management: how do I know you are who you say you are? A plethora of public and private 
services in the Digital Economy are trying to find a meaningful, convenient and reliable answer to the 
need for authentication. 
 
There are also tools and systems to help people meet this need. Technological progress in 
cryptography, identity systems design, smart card design and mobile phone authentication has been 
remarkable. Today, a toolbox of useful technologies may give European users peace of mind in 
accessing services, both in person and remotely on the Internet (where the "who are you?" question is 
hardest to tackle). Yet, these advances have not enabled secure and convenient authentication to 
services across people's many spheres of activity: work, leisure, health, social activities. Least of all 
have they been used to enable cross-border service implementation in the Single Digital Market, or to 
ensure trust in cross border eCommerce. 
 
It is true that recently the Commission and Members States have spearheaded several key initiatives in 
this area, both discretely and jointly – the European Large Scale Action on eID, the Future Internet 
Public-Private Partnership. But very seldom, if ever, the socio-economic impacts of these initiatives 
are clearly assessed, or the added value for Europe stated. We welcome this report as it joins up the 
dots, and provides significant exploratory evidence of the potential of eID for the Single Digital 
Market. A clear understanding of this market is crucial for policy action on identification and 
authentication, eSignature and interoperability. 
 
The study offers an initial exploration of markets where people's identity data are converted into 
credentials for access to services. The picture portrayed is sobering. In principal, the report finds that 
the market for eID is immature. It claims that the potentially great added value of eID technologies in 
enabling the Digital Economy has not yet been fulfilled, and fresh efforts are needed to build 
identification and authentication systems that people can live with, trust and use. The study finds that 
usability, minimum disclosure and portability, essential features of future systems, are at the margin of 
the market and cross-country, cross-sector eID systems for business and public service are only in 
their infancy. 
 
The good news is that the European Institutions and Members States hold the key to this potential, via 
procurement of strong eID in eGovernment services, enhancement of federation and interoperability as 
regulators, support of open governance and participation in standardization in international fora. 
Lastly, the report emphasises the need for future, further research on interoperable credentials, mobile 
phone and smart card authentication, which is where the value added may lie for European citizens, 
public services and business.  
 
We are confident that this report makes a valuable contribution to this cause. 
 
Detlef Eckert 
Director, Lisbon Strategy and Policies for the 
Information Society - Directorate General 
Information Society and Media, European 
Commission  
 
 
John Bensted-Smith 
Director, Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies, Joint Research Centre, 
European Commission 
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 3 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Empowering citizens to be active and confident in the new digital society, which must deliver 
sustainable economic and social benefits, is of prime importance to Europe. EU Information 
Society Ministers are adamant in the Granada Declaration1 that electronic identity (eID) will 
be a key driver of economic recovery in Europe. A crucial action in this respect will be the 
creation of an encompassing, interoperable, open-standards e-Authentication scheme for 
Europe; one that increases the capacity of the EU business and public sector to reduce the 
costs of and barriers to the provision and take up of services, cross-border and online; and one 
that empowers citizens to take and expect responsibility in the digital domain [action points 8-
10, 13, 14, 18-21]. The European Digital Agenda2 also sees eID as central to the EU27 
economy, as it will help to unlock the added value of the Single Market. Key actions in this 
domain include intervention regarding e-Authentication and e-Identification, interoperability 
and open standards, consumer trust and confidence, and strengthening the eCommerce single 
market. 
It is true that trusted and reliable online identity management and authentication are the 
gateway to the digital economy now in the making. They create enormous potential for 
advanced, high quality and efficient services. Though eID systems and processes have been 
developing over decades, they are still not particularly trusted or fit for the many activities 
that European citizens expect to conduct in their everyday digital lifestyles. Strong 
authentication based on cryptography is one of Europe's strength, but has not yet found fertile 
ground in business and government applications. Equally, secure tokens such as smart cards 
and digital credentials, are under-utilised and the growth of awareness and use among 
consumers and small businesses is sluggish. Additionally, the market for eID products and 
services is fragmented, far from efficient and lacks viable business models. Services based on 
mobile authentication and identity management have not yet realised their huge potential 
value. There are great engineering and legal differences between industry- and government-
supported identity management systems across the EU27. As a result, the evolution of inter-
country, interoperable, user-centric eID systems and processes is slow. 
On the other hand, there is the realization that eID technologies and authentication services 
are essential for transactions on the Internet in both the private and public sectors (see 
footnote 2). Trusted, secure and interoperable eID is a key enabler of the Single Digital 
Market. The fulfilment of several objectives of the Digital Agenda and of the Granada 
Declaration rests on the possibility to convert personal identity data into usable, safe and 
trusted credentials for the implementation of cross-border, interoperable public and business 
services. The outcome of both agendas will depend on the capacity to understand, measure 
and monitor, with valid and reliable gauges, the consequences of this eID conversion in 
Europe.3 Effective regulation of the personal identity space and its economic externalities 
requires a clear understanding of how the market for identity functions. But very little is 
                                                     
1  EU Telecoms Ministers. Granada Ministerial Declaration on the European Digital Agenda. Granada, 19 April 
2010: Informal Meeting of Telecommunications and IS Ministers, 2010. Available from 
<http://www.eu2010.es/export/sites/presidencia/comun/descargas/Ministerios/en_declaracion_granada.pdf>. 
2  European Commission. Communication from the Commission - A Digital Agenda for Europe. (COM(2010) 
245). Brussels: European Commission 2010. Available from 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-agenda/links/index_en.htm>. 
3  Point 28 and 29, and Heading 3, of the Digital Agenda and of the Granada declaration respectively.  
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known about emerging identity markets and the business models that support the use of 
personal identity data in transactions. Outcomes go well beyond issues regarding technical 
systems for identification and authentication. Identity has never been monetised to the extent 
that it is today: targeted profiling based on personal identity data is used for behavioural 
tracking; the lead business model for online free services is focused advertising; significant 
savings are achieved in the delivery of public services. Revenues in these fields are 
significant, taking the ideas of authentication for access to services to a different level.  
At the moment, we know very little about eID as an enabler of the Digital Economy. 
Intelligence on market and innovation dynamics is needed to sustain market growth, improve 
service quality for citizens and offer a more cost-efficient and competitive identity framework 
for Member States. In this context, this report explores the trends, barriers and dynamic 
evolution of the European eID market, the roles of key public and private stakeholders within 
the eID marketplace and the processes which these use to create value. The report finds that: 
1. eID infrastructure technologies, embedded in operational applications and services, 
will be critical to the development of broader eID applications, which are likely to 
emerge as a ‘critical mass’ of infrastructure becomes available. Whilst development of 
this infrastructure is a commercial issue, governments may be able to accelerate the 
process by providing incentives and framework conditions for standardisation, open 
development platforms and innovation.  
2. Increasingly advanced eID services, that take the existing infrastructure and 
technologies as a starting point and build on them, so as to create novel added value 
services, are needed. These need to be accompanied and complemented by 'softer' 
services; for instance, consultation, training and risk or credit management. Moreover, 
a more flexible offer of products and services, which would allow customer companies 
to 'mix and match' the most relevant components according to their particular 
demands, would make the eID market more dynamic and better able to adapt to 
changing economic conditions. While most of the above are expected to be offered 
commercially, governments may be able to enhance the ability of companies to offer 
valuable eID solutions by motivating intercompany partnerships, where each company 
specialises in the activities they are most proficient in. 
3. Interoperability and credential portability are key issues in eID market development. 
Currently, the eID market is relatively fragmented, with several standards and 
procedures across the EU27. Increased portability of credentials and use of federated 
identity schemes would result in higher take-up and more extensive use of eID 
solutions, thus contributing to market growth. Future online public services will rely 
on effective and interoperable credentials. For this to happen, appropriate Certificate 
Authorities, and permitted use of government root certificates and regulations to 
permit certificate use in mobile devices, would be needed. 
4. Self-asserted credentials are gaining significant public trust and must be taken into 
account by eID interoperability initiatives. Self-assertion and volunteered personal 
information are shifting the balance of power in identity relationships away from 
traditional providers, initially national authorities and lately companies, towards data 
subjects. This may result in disintermediation for third parties that are no longer 
required, and lead to new business models for eID. However, governments have yet to 
make widespread use of self-asserted eID schemes; therefore a centrally-regulated, 
identity assurance framework for government use of commercial credentials, both 
within and between EU Member States, may be needed. 
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5. The availability of enhanced token devices that consolidate existing multiple tokens, 
and offers users additional functionality through local card readers (or embedded 
equivalents) would lead to greater adoption of certificate-based services, as would the 
incorporation of two-factor authentication into a wider range of identity processes. 
6. Governments are in a key position to drive the development of the eID market, in 
many respects: 
a. As the largest customers of eID, governments have a significant influence on 
what solutions will be developed, what features and functionalities will be 
required, and what identification technologies will be used; 
b. As market regulators, governments may procure a common legal framework 
enforcing the trust new eID services need to flourish. Moreover, governments 
may encourage relevant industry standardisation bodies to work on the rollout 
of interoperable digital certificates; 
c. Innovation in the public sector, particularly in citizen-centric public services, 
will be a catalyst for eID market growth. More rigorous enforcement of 
existing regulatory frameworks to ensure a 'level playing field' may favour 
market growth. 
Further development of affordable and interoperable infrastructure (i.e. smart-card readers), 
raising consensus on dispute resolution and liability management procedures, sharing through 
public-private partnerships of high cost/high risk activities (i.e. arising from large-scale eID 
enrolment schemes) and collecting and disseminating independent and authoritative data on 
eID markets, so as to support commercial and public decision-making processes, will also 
positively influence eID market growth. 
To address these issues, the study proposes a number of policy options for the Commission to 
consider, which can be organised according to the layers of the eID value chain model that 
forms the basis for the analysis. These range from the technical layer to the legislative layers. 
− Policy: develop shared standards and harmonised objectives for clusters of eID 
activities (with very different objectives), supported by public domain information 
about the eID market; 
− Regulation: provide leadership and a standardised EU approach, delivered through 
improved interoperability of Member State eID schemes and a shared regulatory 
framework for eID activities, while not stifling natural innovation; 
− Exploitation: promote innovation and cooperation between government and private 
organisations with a view to delivering open interfaces to eID systems and the use of 
federated eID schemes; 
− Infrastructure: accelerate the process by incentivising standardisation and innovation 
and by undertaking the provision of costly components such as enrolling populations 
into eID schemes; 
− Technology: encourage private sector organisations to develop enhanced user tokens, 
improved biometrics, and portable certificates for use across a range of devices. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Overview 
Electronic identification and identities (eID) are indispensable to ensure access to public and private 
services – including health, education and security. Increasingly more of the personal sphere is 
recorded, stored and analysed to warrant access (e.g., nominal e-ticketing binds identity tags to 
transactions that were previously anonymous). These identity-based transactions take place via an 
increasing number and variety of identity systems. On the Internet, a heterogeneous system of identity 
assurance has built up over time, through a mix of open standardisation, engineering ingenuity and 
sheer monopolistic inertia. There is today a plethora of sector specific solutions (based on e.g. SSL 
encryption, PIN, tokens) and e-services (e.g. based on a PKI infrastructure with either strong or weak 
authentication). 
Personal identity data are the keystone of these systems. People use personal identity data to 
authenticate themselves on systems, to access services on the internet such as email and social 
networking sites; their personal identity data are harvested and analyzed to provide contextual 
advertising and personalised services. In online transactions, personal identity data have never been 
used and monetised to the extent occurring today; they are becoming an important enabler of the 
digital economy. The number of identity-based transactions, both on and off the Internet, has grown 
significantly and will most likely continue to do so. This trend is linked to the increasing prevalence 
and multiplicity of eID systems that feed on such data, channelling personal identity data into 
identification, authentication and access to goods, services and resources.4  
The interoperability eID across the public and private sectors generates significant economic 
externalities. While the economic significance of eID may be largely invisible today, emerging 
mobile, sensor-based and social networking applications facilitate the creation of novel services that, 
in addition to their other functions, enable users to perceive the economic importance of their 
electronic identities. 
The European eID market is considered to be growing, but it is fragmented and often lacks viable 
business models. This raises the a challenge for policymakers of how to ensure that businesses abide 
by existing regulations, while at the same time supporting the economic development of electronic 
identities and services based on them. There is a well-known tension between the collection of 
personal identity data in business-to-consumer transactions and the respect for users' privacy 
preferences.  
Effective regulation of the eID market requires a clear understanding of how it functions. Relatively 
little is known about new identity markets and what business models may support the exchange of 
identity data for services. Research on market and innovation dynamics will support the Commission's 
efforts to sustain the growth of the industry as to provide a more efficient and competition-supporting 
eID framework in Europe. It is thus necessary to study the current state of the identity markets, the 
roles and respective positioning of the various stakeholders and the dynamics of the value chain. This 
Report describes both the method and the substance of an exploratory study on the roles and strategies 
of the stakeholders in the eID market within Europe. It is meant to prepare the ground for a larger, 
more systematic assessment of the eID market in Europe, in the framework of theEurope2020. 
                                                     
4  See M. Meints. Identity Management Systems - recent developments. (Deliverable D3.17). ICPP, Germany: 
FIDIS Network, 2009. Available from: 
<http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/new_deliverables/fidis-wp3-
del3.17_Identity_Management_Systems-recent_developments.pdf>. 
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1.2 Research context and objectives 
A significant number of companies operate in the eID market in Europe and worldwide. However, the 
industry is quite fragmented and in some cases lacks viable business models. Research on market and 
innovation dynamics is needed to support the growth of the industry, contributing to improved quality 
of life for its citizens and a more cost-efficient and competitive identity framework for the Member 
States. 
eID is at a relatively early phase of market development, and consequently still face many challenges. 
It is thus an especially interesting object for study both in terms of market and innovation dynamics 
and in a prospective manner as an example of emerging digital applications. In this context, the study 
is exploratory of the development and dynamics typical of today's eID markets, the key trends taking 
place in the markets, and the differences of the various European identity markets (in terms of factors 
such as market size, relative development, and key drivers and obstacles). 
This study gathers knowledge about the strategies, product portfolios, financial information, dynamics 
between players and about other relevant factors of eID market stakeholders in Europe. This 
knowledge contributes to the overall analysis of the eID market and to a better understanding of the 
economic factors affecting the eID markets national level, the drivers and barriers that affect the 
uptake of electronic identities, the business models likely to prevail and the other factors that 
contribute to generating innovation in the market. The focus of the study includes privacy, security, 
and new business models enabled by development in eID. It is expected to reveal: 
• the nature, structure, developments and dynamics for today’s European eID markets; 
• the key trends in the markets; 
• who the key stakeholders in that market are; 
• the key differences between the European eID markets in terms of size, relative 
development and key drivers and barriers. 
• on what information companies base their eID-related business decisions;  
• what external data sources they have at their disposal. 
1.3 Methodology, data collection and analysis 
The scope of work includes an accurate but not exhaustive analysis of the eID market, of the key 
stakeholders within that market, and the data sources that are available. A number of European 
countries were chosen in light of their eID infrastructure: Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Spain 
and Turkey. The project methodology was light weight and exploratory but theoretically informed; it 
is sufficiently robust to provide the foundation for a possible larger future project. 
Specifically, it comprised:  
• a review of past pan-European analyses in the public and private sectors;  
• an analysis of findings in view of modelling the eID landscape; and  
• an assessment of market and innovation dynamics. 
In order to define a theoretical model, existing principles of value chains were drawn upon, modified 
appropriately so as to apply to the European eID market. This resulted in a fresh theoretical model, 
based upon a study of academic best practice, that brings together key issues of infrastructure and 
technology provision; value-add eID services; control and regulation; and the dependence upon 
existing paper-based ID services to create value for eID. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical example of value chain model 
Source: Authors' elaboration from existing principles 
In accordance with the theoretical model, the study collected detailed information about the eID 
market in Europe, so as to analyse the principal stakeholders in the field. Specifically a view of key 
issues influencing the global, European and national marketplaces, and characteristics of member 
states that may influence their eID strategies was built up. Largely subjective in nature, this work drew 
upon the researchers' expertise and experience rather than formal academic studies. Sources are 
credited as footnotes within the text. 
A number of key stakeholders were interviewed. Telephone interviews based upon a set list of 
questions were used; and summaries of some of the organisations who have contributed have been 
provided, but individual interviewees or sources have not been identified. 
Comprehensive information was gathered about industry stakeholders and their products, services, 
applications, needs and benefits. Data items were assigned one or more metadata ‘tags’ whici 
described, for example, the country, stakeholder type, value chain position or role. Tags were assigned 
on an ad hoc basis to ensure the broadest possible coverage of key issues. Data items were grouped by 
tags, to draw out the key themes from a range of perspectives. Where similar or synonymous tags were 
identified, these were aggregated under a single tag heading. 
The groupings, and their inter-relationships, were examined in order to develop a value chain model 
for eID. The model describes the overall business, its structure and the relationships between the 
various actors, the functioning of the markets and the role/position of the various key stakeholders 
therein. The data items were mapped against the value chain model to define where they are within 
that model; this process was repeated to reveal different findings relating to market sectors, 
stakeholder types or nationalities. 
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2 MODELLING THE EUROPEAN EID 
LANDSCAPE 
2.1 Applying value chains to eID 
To understand the eID landscape it is necessary to examine the relation between different credential 
types, and hence their issuers; to consider their lifecycle, and hence how their value chains are 
structured; to analyse their maturity; and to look at their usage. Key to a successful model is the ability 
to understand the primary and supporting activities in the eID Value Chain. For this assessment, the 
primary activities have been classified into six layers as follow: 
• Policy: Government policy and legislation that shapes and scopes the possible market for eID 
services; 
• Regulation: Controls set in place by government and industry to control the eID market; 
• Liability: Liability and accountability mechanisms used to build stakeholder trust in eID; 
• Exploitation: Use of eID services and technologies by industry, public sector, individuals and 
non-commercial organisations; 
• Infrastructure: Provision and operation of baseline eID infrastructure services; 
• Technology: Underlying technologies used to build and operate eID systems. 
These layers are derived from our experience of the current eID market, and they extend from the 
highest policy levels, through to the low-level technologies that are used to deliver eID systems. These 
are shown in the template Value Chain in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Value chain template 
 
Additional supporting activities are those that do not specifically rest within these categories. For 
example, provision of paper-based credentials to authenticate an asserting party during the 
establishment of an eID relationship is considered to be a supporting activity in this context. 
2.2 Considering eID qualities within the value chain 
eID schemes may have different locations and qualities within the value chain. Issue and usage, 
applicability, lifecycle and maturity are all key issues within the value chain. These are shown on the 
value chain template in Figure 3: 
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Figure 3: Applying credential types and usage to the value chain model 
There are of course exceptions to this general approach, but it provides a useful framework for 
considering credentials where: 
• Issue and usage: credentials may be issued or used across the length of the value chain; more 
commonly from start across to finish, since these represent more ‘trusted’ credentials (e.g. 
State-issued documents); 
• Applicability: credentials (or components of credentials) may apply at different levels within 
the chain – for example a token may provide a credential but not be exploited; 
• Lifecycle: the lifecycle (discussed in this section) covers all aspects of the credential from 
creation through to revocation; 
• Maturity: defines the position of a credential or scheme within a maturity model. 
These characteristics are explained in this section, which also describes the broader value chain model, 
considers the trends within the market and draws conclusions about likely long-term outcomes.  
2.3 Credential issue and usage 
The market for eID in Europe is characterised by three principal divisions, where these divisions are 
controlled by credential issuers: 
1. State-issued credentials: these include national credentials such as passports, and 
regional/federal/departmental credentials such as local entitlement cards or residency passes. 
Credentials are issued in paper, electronic and ‘hybrid’ form (where a hybrid credential might 
be a plastic card with an embedded digital certificate). 
2. Commercially-issued credentials: these include corporate credentials issued to employees for 
access to premises or IT services, banking credentials provided to individuals for online access 
to services, or telecommunication credentials (including mobile phone SIM cards). They are 
provided in paper, electronic and hybrid form. 
3. Self-asserted / user credentials: these credentials are those generated, asserted or trusted by 
individuals or communities without necessarily having any reference to a trusted issuing 
authority. Dominated by ‘low value’ credentials such as those issued for access to online 
communities, these are predominantly electronic-only. 
In general, State-issued credentials are considered to be the ‘most trusted,’ whilst self-asserted are the 
‘least trusted,’ although increasingly there are exceptions to this rule. The challenge for self-asserted 
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credentials is that of becoming acceptable for use in regulated environments, and in particular in the 
financial sector, where ‘know your customer’ (anti-money laundering) rules demand that institutions 
obtain copies of recognised credentials prior to opening accounts. This gives rise to a value chain as 
shown in Figure 4. In this system, the self-asserted credentials are both supporting the State-issued 
and commercially-issued credentials, and deriving their own value from them: operating in a ‘hybrid’ 
mode, where they are often enhanced after their initial use by a check on other credentials, and thus 
move from the ‘supporting’ row to the end of the chain on the right hand side of the diagram. For 
example, an individual may open a PayPal account without providing any form of credential check, 
but if they wish to transfer larger or more frequent sums of money, or to obtain a more trusted 
‘verified’ status, they must submit other credentials for verification.  
 
Figure 4: Credential value chain 
2.4 Applicability of credentials 
Credentials are not exclusively confined to a single division, but may in fact cross through them. This 
most commonly happens where there is a need for greater trust which draws upon a more trusted 
credential than is available to an application, for example: 
• use of a passport as a supporting credential when verifying an individual’s identity during the 
opening of a bank account; 
• driving license used as proof of age; 
• utility bills used as proof of address when requesting local government services; 
• ‘photo ID’ used in support of payment cards. 
This crossover/repurposing of a credential generally occurs where there is a need for a trusted 
credential at a new point in the value chain, which has to be filled by a more trusted authority in the 
absence of any other source.  
2.4.1 Problems 
Few, if any credentials are issued with no regard to where or why they might be used; in other words, 
they are designed and issued with a particular context in mind, even if that context is a very 'inclusive' 
one. However, in many parts of the world, social security numbers and driving license numbers have 
been repurposed as universal indices to track and identify individuals across public and private sectors. 
This may have repercussions for issuing authorities when problems arise; for example, most European 
states offer little or no liability for fraud arising from errors in national identity or passport documents. 
Such frauds themselves give rise to a complex ‘illegal’ value chain where false credentials are 
generated from an original fraudulent breeder document such as a passport, and propagate through the 
identity ecosystem.  
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The problem is amplified when the context spans national or sectoral boundaries, since credentials are 
then being used outside of the regulatory and legal environments in which they were issued. 
2.4.2 Opportunities 
Crossover/repurposing of credentials also presents a market opportunity, since it indicates a need for a 
new or enhanced credential type. It is this repurposing that will form a focus of the value chain 
modelling within our method, since it joins together the steps in the chain. 
2.5 The credential lifecycle 
It is also worth noting that credentials are generally subject to a number of different usage models over 
their lifecycle. Lifecycles themselves vary greatly, but can generally be mapped against a trust model 
as shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Credential lifecycle / trust model 
In this model, the lifecycle comprises four stages: 
• Building/Issuing: The strength of the trust relationship depends upon the integrity of how it is 
established; if rigorous checks are made to ensure that a credential is issued to the correct 
individual, then trust is created. 
• Maintaining: Throughout its usage, trust – and the credential – must be maintained. This 
includes monitoring and updating the credential where necessary. 
• Protecting/Liability: Trust must be protected: the strength of a relationship is judged by what 
each party will do to protect it when there is a problem. This applies to credentials, where all 
parties – but particularly the issuer – must take steps to protect them against fraud or failure. 
Where problems occur, the liability model becomes important, and defines the role of each 
party in repair and restitution. 
• Ending/Revoking: For a trust relationship to maintain its integrity, it must be ended in a 
controlled manner that is satisfactory to all parties, otherwise it will quickly lose its reputation. 
This applies equally to credentials, which must be revoked in accordance with the 
expectations of all stakeholders. 
This lifecycle model, whilst not directly part of our analysis, provides a useful framework to assess the 
effectiveness of a credential scheme. 
2.6 Maturity and adoption 
Whilst in many cases crossover/repurposing represents the use of a more ‘mature’ credential to 
establish greater authority, that is by no means a rule. The level of maturity is less important in 
establishing trust in a credential scheme than the trust in the issuing authority for a credential. 
Traditionally, a government-issued credential would be more trusted than one issued by, for example, 
a supermarket. There are examples of less mature schemes that have become very trusted: an eBay 
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vendor account with a very high reputational score may be considered highly trustworthy in a retail 
relationship without the need for further supporting credentials. 
There is also the question of how, against a background of innovation, some technologies gain 
adoption, and achieve acceptance and maturity, much faster than others. For example, EDI messaging 
was slow to grow and never achieved consumer adoption; and SMS messaging was largely ignored by 
consumers (despite being available from the earliest days of GSM mobile telecommunications) until 
the late 1990s. 
This adoption rate is most likely driven by a broad range of factors including: 
• the underlying need, and readiness of the adoption community; 
• the motivation to adopt the technology, which may include cost-savings or profits for users, 
mandatory/compliance issues, and intervention by government or commercial providers to 
incentivise adoption; 
• removal of barriers to adoption, which may include initial cost, ease of use, cultural 
acceptability or consumer understanding of the need. 
Of course, bringing together all these factors does not provide assurance of adoption: HD-DVD, DAB 
radio, PGP encryption are all examples of technologies that should by rights have succeeded, but have 
failed to meet their potential. Conversely, there are cases where technologies have succeeded despite 
there being no apparent need, or little motivation to adopt: Apple’s iPod has become a byword for 
portable music players, despite early critics failing to understand why people might want the 
technology. 
2.6.1 Achieving maturity 
In considering maturity, it is worth bearing in mind the generic maturity levels in a capability maturity 
model5 that describe the state of a system: 
• Initial: ad-hoc or poorly defined; 
• Repeatable: process dependent upon individuals; 
• Defined: process defined and institutionalised; 
• Managed: measured process; 
• Optimising: improvement fed back in to process. 
2.7 Scope and scale 
Key to assessing the success of a particular eID scheme is the scale of adoption of that scheme. There 
are a number of qualities that characterise successful eID schemes; whilst not common to all 
successes, they are certainly present in many: 
• Compulsion: where credentials are mandatory (e.g. National ID Card schemes) or a necessity 
for normal life (e.g. passports), they achieve widespread adoption. This is normally only 
achievable for State-operated eID schemes; 
• Convenience/Transparency: the SIM cards in mobile phones provide a trusted eID 
infrastructure conveniently and transparently to the user; 
• Pervasiveness/Practicality: where an eID scheme has achieved market dominance – e.g. 
payment cards – people will accept it as a de facto standard. 
Compulsion and pervasiveness may of course be highly undesirable characteristics, as has been 
evidenced by protests against mandatory national ID schemes in the UK, or ‘hidden’ RFID tracking in 
supermarkets.6 
                                                     
5  http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/PRINCE2_Maturity_Model_Version_1.pdf 
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2.8 Summary 
The general Value Chain model can be applied to eID implementations by considering issues of 
policy, regulation, liability, exploitation, infrastructure and technology. These aspects will change 
according to the issue and usage of a credential, its maturity, position within the lifecycle, and 
applicability through the chain. The degree of trust afforded to a credential, and consequently its 
usage, will depend upon its position within the value chain, with State-issued credentials generally 
trusted more than commercial equivalents. In considering the adoption and use of a particular 
credential or scheme, it is important to consider its maturity and position within a trust lifecycle; and 
aspects of compulsion, convenience and pervasiveness in the credential infrastructure. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
6  http://www.spychips.com/metro/protest.html 
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3 PUBLIC SECTOR STAKEHOLDERS 
3.1 Country profiles 
In order to better understand the European eID landscape, it is necessary to consider how individual 
countries’ eID markets have developed. This section describes the eID market in a selection of 
European nations. 
3.1.1 Country analysis: Belgium 
3.1.1.1 Policy 
Belgium has a population of approx 10m individuals, most of whom are expected to hold an eID chip-
card for national identification. The eID card is compulsory from the age of 12, but prior to that, the 
equivalent ‘Kids-ID’ is a voluntary credential. The eID card must be carried from the age of 15, unless 
one is within 200 metres of home. 
Belgian citizens living overseas can also obtain ID credentials.7 In June 2009 the Consulate General in 
Lille began issuing e-ID cards to Belgian citizens, in a service to be extended to all other Belgian 
embassies and consulates. The intention is to facilitate travel in or out of Belgium, and to simplify 
administrative procedures when the citizen temporarily or permanently returns to the country. 
3.1.1.2 Regulation and liability 
The state exercises a monopoly over the granting of eID cards, but not of the identities or, in general, 
the attributes of physical persons. The state may, for instance, retain an exclusive right to ‘bestow’ a 
particular attribute on an individual (for instance, the attributes associated with an office of public 
administration, a title, etc.) but this does not preclude, say, professional bodies retaining the exclusive 
right to bestow other attributes. 
The laws on identity distinguish between physical and moral persons; there is no eID card for moral 
persons (i.e. corporate entities, companies etc), though the state retains the exclusive right to issue an 
identifier to moral persons (e.g. company registration number).8 The individual’s Numéro de Registre 
National (NRN) is considered to be a public value (in fact, it is visible in every eID cardholder’s 
certificate), but (as in Norway) third parties are not supposed to use it without explicit prior approval 
from the administrative committee of the National Register.9 There is, however, no apparent technical 
protection to prevent such use – the control is legislative only. 
3.1.1.3 Exploitation 
There is a wide range of public sector, community and commercial service providers exploiting the 
eID card, with applications including diary management for Prime Minister's Chancery; access to 
regional GIS databases; education (all tiers); healthcare, electronic patient records and database access, 
clinical data; transport and ticketing (e.g. de Lijn); generic access control – i.e. third party developers 
implement eID-based authentication for service providers; digital signing by card-holder; electronic 
tax returns and other e-administrative tasks, forms etc.; real estate transactions. 
                                                     
7  http://www.diplomatie.be/en/press/homedetails.asp?TEXTID=97135 
8  http://eid.belgium.be/fr/binaries/FAQ_FR_tcm146-22451.pdf 
9  http://eid.belgium.be/fr/binaries/FAQ_FR_tcm146-22451.pdf 
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3.1.1.4 Infrastructure 
The Belgian eID card has been used as the basis for a broader eID infrastructure in which private 
sector organisations can participate. This has been achieved by developing a middleware interface 
where the government has published (but retains control of) the source code. The client (card reader) 
software is based on a Debian Linux open source library.  
3.1.1.5 Technologies 
The Belgian eID scheme10 is built upon Sun Microsystems’ Java Card technology, with Gemalto 
providing the cards, in a project that was managed by CSC.11 Cardholders are able to purchase readers 
as well to simplify online use of the card for authentication and signing (the government has in fact 
‘primed’ the market for readers by encouraging vendors to integrate them into all new PCs). 
Furthermore, interfaces have been provided into Adobe and Microsoft software to simplify and 
encourage adoption. 
3.1.2 Country analysis: Finland 
3.1.2.1 Policy 
Finland’s population of 5.3m individuals are subject to a voluntary ID card scheme, although all are 
obliged to register in the National Population Register.12 Finnish eID cards were the first ever to be 
issued, and have been issued since 1999, at which time the National Population Register also began to 
issue digital certificates.13 
3.1.2.2 Regulation and liability 
Finland’s data protection environment is regulated by the Data Protection Ombudsman, appointed by 
the Council of State.14 National identity and eID issues are overseen by the Population Register 
Centre. Finnish citizens have the option to forbid disclosure of their National Population Register data 
for several purposes, including direct advertising, genealogical research and public directories.  
The Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority (FICORA) supervises Certification Authorities 
(CAs). The Population Register Centre is the Government’s own CA. Certain Finnish 
telecommunication operators are authorised by the government to issue electronic certificates for use 
in mobile applications. Certificates may be embedded in the eID card, a chip embedded Visa Electron 
card issued by the OP Bank Group, or the SIM card of a mobile telephone.15 
3.1.2.3 Exploitation 
Finnish eID cards are issued by local police in normal, minor and temporary forms.16 From 2004 
Finnish citizens were allowed to include their health insurance data in their ID card, thus removing the 
need to have a separate card for each. From 2008 KELA (the social insurance institution) stopped 
issuing new photo-cards – though photo-less ones continue to be issued.  
                                                     
10  http://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/publications/article-769.pdf 
11  http://www.csc.com/be/case_studies/9579-
electronic_id_card_belgium_implements_affordable_digital_id_cards 
12  http://www.ips.gov.uk/cps/files/ips/live/assets/documents/2005-02-
07_URN_13_FOICR394_Final_Reply.pdf 
13  http://www.e.finland.fi/netcomm/news/showarticle.asp?intNWSAID=15229 
14  http://www.tietosuoja.fi/1560.htm 
15  http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288228 
16  http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/home.nsf/pages/F082D8AB29097DB5C2256C29002BA66C 
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A national strategy for IT in health and social care was issued in 1996, and by 1998 there were pilot 
projects for the integration of previously fragmented county-level (regional) Electronic Patient Record 
(EPR) systems. In the early 2000s a ‘reference directory’ was established to provide an integrated 
source of information about the location of EPRs in local and regional systems. By 2011 clinicians 
will be required to use this directory.17 
3.1.2.4 Infrastructure 
Finland’s eID approach demonstrates a high degree of integration between card- and mobile-based 
authentication services, probably largely because of the extremely high penetration of mobile 
networks and the distributed, low-density population pattern. 
As of March 2007 a US OpenID provider (TrustBearer) announced18 support for the Finnish eID card 
– meaning that the card could be used to gain access to sites requiring an OpenID authentication. In 
November 2008, Valimo (mobile identification service provider) and Elisa (mobile network operator) 
agreed19 to implement mobile electronic identification, digital signature and PIN-based Single Sign-
On to web services for Elisa's 2.5m mobile subscribers. In Finland this requires a linkage between the 
individual's registered ID and the SIM card. Valimo's services are also in use in Estonia (Elisa) and 
Turkey (Türkcell). Finland has issued biometric passports since 2006, citing EU security goals as the 
justification.20 
3.1.2.5 Technologies 
The cards are based on Gemalto technology, manufactured in Finland and using Java Cards. 
3.1.3 Country analysis: France 
3.1.3.1 Policy 
France’s national identity card (CNI) has been voluntary since 1955 for the 62m population. 
Unfortunately, it has for many years been undermined by mistrust, for example retailers would ask to 
see another form of ID as well as the card, when accepting cheques because of the simplicity of 
forging a card. In 1988 the card was ‘rebranded’ as a secure national identity card (CNIS) when 
additional security features were added (but without eID features). Machine-readable cards were 
introduced in 1995. 
In 2005 the then Prime Minister, Dominique de Villepin, endorsed proposals for a new national 
identity card along lines very similar to the UK: biometrics on the chip, a centralised register of 
biometric and biographical details, and a fee for issuing the card. The French card was to be 
compulsory. As the National Commission on IT and Liberties (CNIL) observes,21 this was the first 
time an identity document had been introduced in France with the sole aim of identifying the bearer, as 
opposed to establishing their entitlement to exercise some right. The proposals spurred massive 
debate, and as a result, the project was effectively halted pending a Senate commission review. A 
subsequent e-Passports project continues, and as of June 2008 the CNIL was expressing its 
reservations about this, the first ever centralised database of French citizens’ biometric details.22 Its 
view was the Government's case for the database failed to show that it was proportionate to the 
expected outcomes. 
                                                     
17  http://www.ehealtheurope.net/features/Finland/ 
18  http://www.trustbearer.com/news_fineid.html 
19  http://www.arcticstartup.com/2008/11/03/valimo-signs-elisa-to-offer-mobile-identification-in-finland-and-
estonia/ 
20  http://www.poliisi.fi/poliisi/home.nsf/pages/578F1B567FAFF824C22571CE00530098?opendocument 
21  http://www.cnil.fr/dossiers/identite-numerique/fiches-pratiques/article/287/que-contient-la-carte-nationale-
didentite-aujourdhui/ 
22  http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number3.13/IDFrance 
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3.1.3.2 Regulation and liability 
In the 1970s a proposal to create a single, centralised index linking all citizens’ departmental (state) 
IDs via a single ‘national identity number’ provoked such opposition that the CNIL was created 
specifically to guard against the erosion of citizens’ liberties through technology. 
It is not unusual for police to ask for proof of ID in France: the law says the citizen may prove their 
identity ‘by any means’: it is up to the law enforcement officer to decide whether the means offered is 
valid.23 Citizens may present a driving license or a passport, even an expired one, or call witnesses.24 
France has a well-developed Certification Authority infrastructure, with 11 authorised CAs.25 France 
is currently testing digital signatures at a local government level. 
3.1.3.3 Exploitation 
Two government portals (service.public and mon-service.public) offer public service information and 
citizen-centric functions respectively. For example, service.public has life-event themed information 
about commonly-used public services; as of Jan 2008, two-thirds of public services had been put 
online via the portal. The complementary mon-service.public portal provides a virtual vault where 
users can store the authoritative version of their personal information (such as address) and electronic 
copies of documents relating to their interaction with public bodies (such as birth certificates and tax 
returns).  
3.1.3.4 Infrastructure 
An additional eID healthcare card has been issued in France:26 the SESAM-Vitale card is provided by 
a group of health insurance funds and used for healthcare access only. It does not have a bearer photo 
on it. As of 2004 it was reported that there were 10m more SESAM-Vitale cards in circulation than 
eligible citizens. As a consequence, SESAM-Vitale 2,27 a technology refresh with better security, 
started in 2007. In the new architecture, the card does include a bearer photo, and must be used along 
with the healthcare professional's card (CPS) to unlock access to the central EPR system. SESAM-
Vitale-2 is a joint project of SAGEM, France Telecom and Atos Origin. 
3.1.3.5 Technologies 
France has an exceptionally well-developed eID industry, which includes industry-leading technology 
in fingerprint recognition (SAGEM), and smart-card/SIM and related capabilities (Oberthur, Gemalto 
– with its heritage of Bull, Schlumberger, Gemplus and Axalto). 
3.1.4 Country analysis: Germany 
3.1.4.1 Policy 
It is compulsory for Germany’s 82m citizens to register for national ID cards from age 16, although 
there is no obligation to carry the card.  
3.1.4.2 Regulation and liability 
The German constitution prevents centralisation of personal information by the State (although this 
does not apply to visa applicants or people registered by the police for investigation into criminal 
activity). The German ID Card Act 1987, prohibits the use of unique ID numbers and storage of data 
                                                     
23  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_document#France 
24  http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number3.8/ID 
25  http://www.net-entreprises.fr/Html/certificat.htm 
26  http://www.ehealtheurope.net/Features/item.cfm?docId=195 
27  http://www.sesam-vitale.fr/programme/programme_eng.asp 
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on a central register. The population are generally supportive of ID cards, but wary of biometric ID 
technologies. An example of this nervousness about some technologies is the high-profile opposition 
to the Metro Group’s experiments with RFID item level tagging and contactless loyalty cards. 
A Federal Information Commissioner and State Information Commissioners oversee the use of 
personal information, and have a reputation for punitive intervention where data protection rules are 
breached, e.g. Citibank/German Railways,28 SWIFT.29 Digital signature laws provide stringent 
technical definitions for the use of e-signatures. 
Germany has a well-established ecosystem of Certificate Authority (CA) service providers, including 
issuers of certificates and digital-signature-capable smart cards, including TeleSec, D-Trust, Deutsche 
Post, TC Trust Center, DGN Deutsches Gesundheitsnetz Service, Medisign and Deutscher Sparkassen 
Verlag. The government accredits CAs, and government-issued ID underpins most identity services. 
Germany generally suffers lower levels of identity-related fraud compared with other developed 
nations. 
3.1.4.3 Exploitation 
The new German eID card is intended for government and commercial use. Commercial functions 
include allowing users to generate one-way pseudonyms for privacy protection. German railways also 
operate a contactless ticketing system in which customers can purchase a ticket using a mobile phone. 
Because of the legacy system, the ticket is sent as a bar code via MMS, which can then be machine-
read from the phone’s display. German citizens also use an Electronic Health Card for access to health 
services. 
3.1.4.4 Infrastructure 
German public services rely heavily on the national ID card. The cards are produced by the (Federal) 
Bundesdruckerei, but managed regionally. From Nov 2010, an eID card will replace the current 
scheme, and is envisaged as having three principal uses: a biometrically-secured travel document; a 
physical vehicle for an electronic ID credential, allowing the user to make trustworthy assertions to 
third parties online; a means for the citizen to generate qualified electronic signatures, for e-Gov and 
e-Business applications. The user has control over eID functions in online use. Service providers need 
a Federal certificate which specifies the card fields they may access, and that access is user authorised 
with a PIN. 
3.1.4.5 Technologies 
Germany has a well-established eID marketplace, with Giesecke+Devrient (G+D) the leading provider 
of smart card technology, and Deutsche Telekom (T-Mobile) and Siemens wielding a great deal of 
influence. 
3.1.5 Country analysis: Spain 
3.1.5.1 Policy 
Spain’s population of 40m are subject to a compulsory national ID card (Documento Nacional de 
Identidad – DNI) for all citizens over the age of 14. The bearer must present it if demanded by a police 
officer, but this may take the form of asking the police officer to the place where the card is kept. The 
DNI is used as proof of identity for a very wide range of transactional functions, including loan/bank 
account applications, contract signature, police fines etc. It is one the valid forms of identification 
which may be used to prove identity for voting (though driving license, passport and some other 
official documents are also valid). 
                                                     
28  http://www.privacyinternational.org/survey/phr2003/countries/germany.htm 
29  http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd%5B347%5D=x-347-542162 
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An eID version of the DNI was introduced in 2006, and includes digital signature capabilities. Roll-
out of the electronic card reached 420,000 citizens by March 2007, and some 9 million by March 
2009. Also since 2006, Spain has been issuing EU-compliant ePassports with biometric data on the 
chip. 
3.1.5.2 Regulation and liability 
The Spanish Data Protection Authority is the Agencia Española de Protección de Datos.30 Spain has 
very specific regulations for the management of personal information; for example, the exact nature of 
security measures to protect personal information is specified in law. Spain has 14 commercial 
Certificate Authorities as well as several non-commercial providers.31  
3.1.5.3 Exploitation 
Spain has long-established commercial CA services: ACE (Agencia de Certification Electronica) was 
set up in 1997 as a joint venture between Telefonica, Sermepa (IT and payment services provider) and 
others, with Verisign CA technology and Visa/Mastercard licenses. ACE did pioneering work on 
qualified certificates and signatures in the early 2000s.32 The PKI/CA infrastructure in Spain is 
relatively mature. There is a public CA (CERES) and a multi-PKI validation service (@firma), the 
latter set up explicitly to encourage the use of eID and eSignature capabilities in the delivery of G2C 
applications and services. Spanish regional and commercial PKI capabilities are also quite well-
established. In the early 2000s, the Spanish were already demonstrating digital signature-based 
applications for multi-party real-estate transactions (i.e. including transfer of title, mortgage approval 
and so on), e-voting (first municipal e-voting elections held using a mobile e-polling station33), and in 
2004 remote e-voting systems were piloted in several regions. 
3.1.5.4 Infrastructure 
Spain has a highly federated government structure, with 17 autonomous regions; these and 16 central 
government ministries are all linked by a governmental intranet, conceived in 2000 and implemented 
in 2002. There is also a network (SARA) which connects central government agencies, all the 
autonomous communities and 1,600 local municipalities. SARA provides public sector bodies with 
common access to the following functions: checking a person's identity and residence data; @firma , 
the multiPKI validation platform for eID and eSignature services; notification of a change of address; 
certified electronic notification; payment gateway; single electronic registry; catalogues of the 
procedures of the Public Administrations; videoconference; Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP); 
collaborative working environments. 
Citizen e-government delivery is achieved through a 3-part system called ‘Red 060’ (‘Network 
060’).34 The portal was launched in 2006, and as of March 2009 linked to some 1,225 public service 
providers at local, regional and national level. There is also a programme to reduce the effort required 
for local/municipal bodies to implement and deliver common e-government and e-administration 
services. The Avanza35 project is run by FEMP – the Spanish Federation of Municipalities and 
Provinces. It makes available a standard application suite and set of IT platforms so that authorities 
can integrate citizen-facing services with back-end functions such as accounting and geographic 
information systems (GIS). 
                                                     
30  https://www.agpd.es/portalweb/index-ides-idphp.php 
31  http://www11.mityc.es/prestadores/busquedaPrestadores.jsp 
32  http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/publications/enisa_quarterly_10_08.pdf 
33  http://www.tiresias.org/research/guidelines/evoting_projects.htm#spain 
34  http://www.060.es 
35  http://www.planavanza.es/AvanzaLocal/Estrategia/ContextoPlanAvanzayEELL/AvanzaLocalSolu/ 
 27 
3.1.5.5 Technologies 
Spanish ID Cards (DNIe) are provided by the Royal Spanish Mint (FNMT-RCM), using embedded 
chips provided by ST Microelectronics.36  
3.1.6 Country analysis: Turkey 
3.1.6.1 Policy 
Plans for a biometric eID card for Turkey’s 70m citizens were announced in July 2007. The card will 
be used solely for identity verification purposes, and will store static identity-related information but 
no dynamic information such as address, healthcare data etc. It will include a fingerprint biometric, but 
this is to be stored only on the card, with no centralised copy. The July 2007 announcement also 
detailed a 3-stage pilot implementation project with initial stages in healthcare and social services use 
of the eID card. Phase 2 is reported to have concluded in Jan 2009 and Phase 3 started in May 2009. 
3.1.6.2 Regulation and liability 
Turkey’s strategy for eID is overseen by the ‘eTransformation Turkey Project37’ which includes 
representation from ministries, central public agencies, NGOs and universities. The government has 
enacted e-signature laws that are EU Member States compatible and has three commercial 
Certification Authorities. 
3.1.6.3 Exploitation 
The Turkish mobile sector is relatively mature and sophisticated, with operators such as Turkcell 
delivering innovative mobile-based services including digital signature (since March 2008). The 
banking sector is similarly mature, with 12 banks already capable of using mobile signatures by 2007, 
and five of those signed up to the Turkcell mobile signature programme.38 Consumers use the 
signature services for loan applications, authentication, mobile banking, cardless ATM usage and 
transaction confirmation services. The e-Government portal (e-Devlet Kapısı),39 developed and 
operated by Turksat (satellite network and IT services company), combines about 19 agencies and 
over 50 services. The portal was launched in December 2008. 
3.1.6.4 Infrastructure 
Since January 2003, the MERNIS central population register has maintained a single ID number for 
some 120m Turkish citizens (living and deceased), including computerised birth certificates. Public 
agencies with appropriate security authorisation are able to access MERNIS through KPS – the 
Identity Information Sharing System. For tax, online theft reporting, job search and library services a 
relatively mature, a semi-transactional online service is available. For most other e-government 
functions the service is information-only and/or geographically patchy in implementation (e.g. 
Ankara-only). 
3.1.6.5 Technologies 
The Turkish government is now piloting the new eID scheme in the town of Bolu. It has developed a 
smartcard reader terminal for commercial and home use.  
                                                     
36  http://www.st.com/stonline/stappl/cms/press/news/year2006/t2079.htm 
37  http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/servlets/Doc?id=29099 
38  http://goliath.ecnext.com/coms2/gi_0199-7518968/TURKCELL-LAUNCHES-MOBILE-SIGNATURE-
SERVICE.html 
39  https://www.turkiye.gov.tr/portal/dt?channel=icerik&icerik.kat=Vatanda%C5%9F 
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3.1.7 Summary 
A selective analysis of six EU nations reveals developmental differences in their adoption of eID 
technologies. Whilst the sample is not sufficiently large to draw ‘definitive’ conclusions, it would 
appear reasonable to conclude that the provision by the State of a trusted eID mechanism, in which 
businesses are prepared to invest trust, is key to promoting adoption of eID technologies. To make 
this work, a government eID scheme requires supporting infrastructure that includes: 
• open access to the eID scheme by industry, including the ability to utilise system interfaces 
without licensing fees, and publication of clear standards for interface purposes; 
• availability of Certification Authorities who can issue certificates for specific applications, 
sectors or territories; 
• portability of certificates so that they are not embedded solely in a smartcard (or the ability 
to make copies for use elsewhere); 
• provision of a smart card infrastructure so that individuals can reasonably expect to have 
access to card readers at home, work and in public places. 
 
3.2 Comparison of national identity schemes 
The Country Profiles in Section 4.1 suggest that government provision of a population-scale eID 
infrastructure, coupled with open access, availability of Certification Authorities, portability of 
certificates and provision of smart card readers, are all factors in the success of an eID scheme. This 
section explores these aspects of national eID schemes for a broader range of European countries. 
3.2.1 Evaluation criteria 
Based upon the criteria suggested by Section 4.1, a number of factors have been selected to compare 
eID implementations by key headings: 
• Policy: whether there is an obligation to enrol in a scheme, carry an eID card, or the ability to use 
it as a travel document (for this we assume travel to be within the Schengen zone40); 
• Implementation: details of the issuer, and approximately how many individuals have been 
enrolled; 
• Exploitation: availability of independent national Certification Authorities (CAs), and availability 
of ‘portable’ certificates (i.e. those which can be used outside of the issued credential, such as 
embedded in a mobile phone); 
• Infrastructure: availability of smartcard readers for end-users to interface with the scheme. 
3.2.2 Comparison of National Identity Schemes 
The comparison of National Identity Schemes is shown in Table 1, with key notes as follows: 
• Compulsory enrolment: where individuals are legally obliged to enrol in the scheme, and the 
minimum age is known, this has been indicated; 
• 3rd-Party CAs: every country under scrutiny operates independent Certification Authorities (CAs), 
but where the number of CAs is known, this has been indicated; 
• Portable Certificates: indicates whether the certificates can be copied/issued to devices other than 
the ID card; 
• End-User Card Readers: indicates whether the scheme supports card readers for end users (as 
opposed to solely for government use). 
                                                     
40  http://europa.eu/abc/travel/doc/index_en.htm 
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Feature Policy42 Implementation Exploitation Infrastructure 
Country 
Population 
(m)41 
Scheme Compulsory 
Enrolment 
Compulsory 
Carry 
Travel 
Document Issuer 
Rollout 
Status 
3rd-
Party 
CAs 
Portable 
Certificates 
Open 
Interface 
End-User 
Card 
Readers 
 
Austria 8.1 Bürgerkarte N N Y Ministry of Finance 8m Y Y Y43 Y 
Belgium 10.4 eID From 15 Y Y FEDICT 8m 2 Y Y Y 
Estonia 1.3 ID-Card/ Mobiil-ID Y N Y 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications 1m Y Y Y Y 
Finland 5.2 FINEID From 16 Y Y Population Register Centre 265,000 Y Y Y Y 
France 60.0 INES N N Y Interior Ministry N/K 11 Y Y Y 
Germany 82.6 Digital IDCard Y Y Y Interior Ministry Pending Y N N Y 
Italy 57.8 CIE N N Y Local Administrations 40m 19 N/K N/K N/K 
Netherlands 16.3 DigiD / eNIK From 14 Y Y Interior Ministry N/K 4 N/K N/K N/K 
Spain 42.5 DNIe From 14 Y Y National Police 18m44 14 N/K N/K N/K 
Sweden 9.0 Nationellt Identitetskort N N Y 
Tax Office / Police / Transport 
Board 3m
45 Y Y Y Y 
Turkey 71.3 eID Card From birth Y N General Directorate on Population and Citizenship Affairs 
Pilot 
area 3 N N Y 
United 
Kingdom 61 NIS 
With 
passport N Y Home Office 
Pilot 
area 4 N N/K N 
Table 1: Comparison of eID Schemes 
                                                     
41  http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/europe.htm 
42  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_identity_card_policies_by_country 
43  http://www.a-sit.at/pdfs/rp_eid_in_austria.pdf 
44  http://blog.negonation.com/en/smart-cards-in-europe-eid-avalanche/ 
45  Data as of 2006: http://www.epractice.eu/en/document/288382 
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3.2.3 Summary 
The analysis does not provide conclusive information about interoperability or adoption of eID in the 
nations surveyed, since there are such great variations in the nature, age and delivery of national eID 
programmes. Clearly a compulsion to enrol and carry an ID card will ensure a greater level of 
adoption. However, it is clear that certain schemes have been more successful than others: Belgium 
and Estonia in particular have achieved widespread adoption and delivery of eID services. 
Where national eID schemes have been successful, it is likely that the 
availability of third-party certificates; portability of those certificates; 
and provision of end-user card reader devices have promoted adoption. 
3.3 Public sector initiatives 
In this section we describe a selection of the key public-sector eID stakeholders in Europe. These 
cover research projects and government agencies. 
3.3.1 Projects 
There are a number of key projects – primarily funded by the European Commission – that are 
exploring and establishing pan-European standards in eID. 
3.3.1.1 FIDIS 
The Future of Identity in the Information Society (FIDIS)46 is a large EU FP6 Network of Excellence 
targeting various aspects of digital identity and privacy. The partners of the project are universities and 
companies working in areas related to digital identity. FIDIS areas of interest include new forms of ID 
cards, usage of identifiers in information systems, technologies used for citizen's identification and 
profiling. The activities cover: 
• ‘identity of identity’ (definitions of key terms in the domain); 
• profiling; 
• interoperability of IDs and ID management systems; 
• forensic implications; 
• privacy and the legal-social content of identity; 
• high-tech ID; 
• mobility and Identity. 
FIDIS has provided a number of publications on the changing nature of ‘natural’ to ‘digital’ identity, 
and predictive publications on possible scenarios for the future of ID. This includes substantial work 
on the nature of 'partial identities' or personae. FIDIS started in 2004, and whilst it has technically 
finished, the project continues to provide deliverables. 
                                                     
46  http://www.fidis.net 
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3.3.1.2 STORK 
3.3.1.2.1 Overview 
STORK47 is a large-scale pilot operated by a consortium of European Public Administrations and 
private partners and 50% co-funded by the EU. It aims to implement an EU-wide interoperable system 
for recognition of eID and authentication that will enable businesses, citizens and government 
employees to use their national electronic identities in any Member State. It will also pilot cross-
border eGovernment identity services and learn from practice on how to roll out such services, and to 
experience what benefits and challenges an EU-wide interoperability system for recognition of eID 
will bring.  
3.3.1.2.2 Objectives 
The STORK interoperable solution for eID is based on a distributed architecture that will pave the way 
towards full integration of EU e-services while taking into account specifications and infrastructures 
currently existing in EU Member States. The goal is to simplify administrative formalities by 
providing secure online access to public services across EU borders. The solution provided is intended 
to be robust, transparent, safe to use and scalable, and should be implemented in such a way that it is 
sustainable beyond the life of the pilot.  
3.3.1.2.3 Actions 
The project will: 
• develop common rules and specifications to assist mutual recognition of eIDs across national 
borders; 
• test, in real life environments, secure and easy-to-use eID solutions for citizens and 
businesses; 
• interact with other EU initiatives to maximize the usefulness of eID services. 
3.3.1.2.4 Outcomes 
STORK takes diverse implementations and reduces them to a simple set of architectural options, 
which simplifies interoperability of the member states’ ID systems. Pilots including private sector 
Identity Service Providers are expected to go live in 2011. 
3.3.1.2.5 Stakeholders 
The project’s key stakeholders include: 
a) Private sector companies working on eID who collaborate through the STORK Industry 
Group; 
b) other European Public Administrations (Member State Reference Group); 
c) other EC funded Large Scale Pilots on eID; and  
d) European Commission A2A services such as ECAS. 
STORK does not have competitors as such, since it is a public sector driven initiate. Nevertheless, 
commercial solutions in the field of eID could somehow overshadow public administrations’ efforts if 
alignment is not successfully achieved. 
                                                     
47  http://www.eid-stork.eu/ 
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3.3.1.2.6 eID value chain 
STORK is intended to become a reference model that can be made extensively available to both the 
private and public sectors Europe-wide, given the large number of countries and administrations 
involved in the consortium and the extraordinary effort put to develop an infrastructure that covers 
most of the stakeholders’ needs. 
 Figure 6: STORK Value Chain 
3.3.1.3 PRIME 
PRIME,48 an EU FP6 project, concluded in June 2008. PRIME aimed to develop a working prototype 
of a privacy-enhancing Identity Management System, and included formative work on PETs (Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies) and their potential contribution to a trusted information society. To foster 
market adoption, novel solutions for managing identities had been demonstrated in challenging real-
world scenarios, e.g., from Internet Communication, Airline Passenger Processes, Location-Based 
Services and Collaborative e-Learning. PRIME was primarily a research project. The work on 
prototype development was a means to validate its new scientific and research results. PRIME's work 
is now continued by PrimeLife, PRIME's follow-up project. 
3.3.1.4 PRIMELife 
The successor to PRIME, PRIMElife49 is an FP7-funded project researching core privacy and trust 
issues. The programme’s objective is to facilitate anonymity in life-long personal data trails without 
compromising on system functionality. To achieve this, PRIMELife will focus on areas of human 
computer interfaces, configurable policy languages, web service federations, infrastructures and 
privacy-enhancing cryptography. Open Source communities and standardisation bodies will be 
encouraged to adopt privacy technologies. The project started in 2009 and is still in its early stages, 
but highly relevant to eID interoperability.  
3.3.2 Academic federation/inter-federation 
3.3.2.1 Kantara 
The Kantara50 initiative was established in 2008 to create a robust focal point for collaboration within 
the identity community. The programme aims to bring together work on key issues including 
interoperability and compliance testing, identity assurance, policy, privacy and software development. 
                                                     
48  https://www.prime-project.eu/ 
49  http://www.primelife.eu/ 
50  http://kantarainitiative.org/ 
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Members of the initiative (who contribute towards its funding) include the DataPortability Project,51 
the Concordia Project,52 Liberty Alliance,53 the Internet Society (ISOC),54 the Information Card 
Foundation (ICF),55 OpenLiberty.org and XDI.org. Kantara is unique as the first time that so many 
other initiatives have collaborated on a common goal of improving adoption of interoperability within 
identity.  
3.3.2.2 TERENA (EU) 
Terena56 provides a forum to collaborate, innovate and share knowledge in order to foster the 
development of Internet technology, infrastructure and services to be used by the research and 
education community. In the context of eID, Terena looks at interoperability between existing 
federations. Established US federation programmes with Terena liaison include Internet/257 and 
InCommon.58 Terena is engaged in ground-breaking work in attribute-level authentication, and 
technical and policy-level interoperability of Levels of Assurance (LoAs). 
3.3.3 Government initiatives 
Government agencies, projects or academic programmes provide a valuable contribution to the eID 
industry. This section describes some of the notable government activities in eID. 
3.3.3.1 ENISA 
The European Network Information Security Agency (ENISA)59 was established in 2004 to achieve a 
high and effective level of Network and Information Security within the European Union. Together 
with the EU-institutions and the Member States, ENISA seeks to develop a culture of Network and 
Information Security for the benefit of citizens, consumers, business and public sector organisations in 
the European Union. Operative networks contribute to the smooth functioning of the Internal Market, 
and concretely affect the daily lives of the citizens and business alike, using broadband, online 
banking, ecommerce, and mobile phones. 
ENISA’s specific expertise in IT and network security has created published resources on ‘Web 2.0 
and e-Government,’ ‘Social Engineering,’ ‘Security Features of European eID cards,’ and 
‘Technology-induced challenges in Privacy and Data Protection.’ ENISA has more recently been 
looking at issues of interoperability on eID. 
3.3.3.2 OECD 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)60 brings together the 
governments of countries committed to democracy and the market economy from around the world to 
support sustainable economic growth, boost employment, raise living standards, maintain financial 
stability, assist other countries' economic development, and contribute to growth in world trade. The 
OECD has a specific Working Party on Information Security and Privacy (WISP)61 that has published 
policymaker guidance papers on ‘Digital Identity Management in the Internet Economy,’ ‘Online 
Identity Theft,’ and ‘Personhood and Digital Identity in the Information Society.’ 
                                                     
51  http://www.dataportability.org/ 
52  http://projectconcordia.org/ 
53  http://www.projectliberty.org/ 
54  http://www.isoc.org/ 
55  http://informationcard.net/ 
56  http://www.terena.org/ 
57  http://www.internet2.edu/ 
58  http://www.incommonfederation.org/ 
59  http://www.enisa.europa.eu 
60  http://www.oecd.org/ 
61  http://www.oecd.org/sti/security-privacy 
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3.3.3.3 CCD-COE 
Estonia’s Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD-COE)62 has a mission to enhance 
the capability, cooperation and information sharing among NATO, NATO nations and partners in 
cyber defence by virtue of education, research and development, lessons learned and consultation. 
Whilst the defence focus means that much of the cyber-security work will be aimed at Critical 
National Infrastructure (CNI) protection, it is anticipated that the CCD-COE will also produce insights 
into the role of eID across Europe. 
3.3.3.4 tScheme 
tScheme63 is the UK’s co-regulatory body for approving providers of electronic trust services 
(although it is not mandatory to obtain such approval to operate as a credential provider). tScheme’s 
remit initially covered PKI providers, but more recently this has expanded to cover providers of 
generic identity credentials. tScheme operates ‘service approvals’ for ID providers to assure users of 
service integrity. It also works with central government to provide authenticated access to shared 
services. 
The organisation has its roots in a group of trade bodies that came together in 1998 to promote identity 
assurance. It is funded by member organisations subscriptions and license fees from approved service 
providers. Current approved providers include: 
• TrustAssured (Royal Bank of Scotland); 
• Certificate Factory (Trustis); 
• Managed PKI (BT); 
• SecureMark; 
• NHS_RootCA (National Health Service); 
• ARTL (Registers of Scotland). 
                                                     
62  http://www.ccdcoe.org/ 
63  http://www.tscheme.org/ 
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4 STAKEHOLDERS AND VALUE CHAINS 
4.1 Introduction 
As part of the broader eID market analysis, a desktop survey of key eID stakeholders was conducted. 
The researchers drew upon their own experience, and information provided by IPTS to facilitate the 
investigation. This information was then used to profile those stakeholders and drive the development 
of an eID stakeholder ecosystem model. This section describes the process and outcomes of the 
stakeholder analysis. 
4.2 Stakeholder analysis 
The stakeholder analysis used a desktop survey to identify 193 organisations operating in the eID 
sector. These were examined, classified, and the data was listed in a spreadsheet. The IPTS 
Stakeholder Analysis workbook comprises three sheets: 
• Primary analysis: Those stakeholders for which information was readily available, either online 
or through interviews/questionnaires, and for which the most detailed analysis has been prepared; 
• Secondary analysis: Those stakeholders for which less information was available, and as such 
have characteristics documented less completely than the Primary analysis stakeholders; 
• Other stakeholders: Identified stakeholders, with nationality, which were not researched further. 
In the majority (but not all) cases, these organisations are smaller or less focussed on the eID 
market than those in preceding sheets;  
• Outlying stakeholders: Stakeholders that are no longer trading, not relevant to eID, or have been 
acquired by another party, together with the reason for their inclusion on this sheet. 
The headings for the Primary analysis are shown in Table 2: 
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Heading Description 
Name / Title / 
Organisation / 
Email / Website 
Stakeholder contact details 
Country Country in which organisation is headquartered 
Status Legal status of organisation 
Category Primary activity of organisation 
Type Type of primary eID activity as defined in FIDIS’ categorisation of Identity 
Management Systems (IMS):64 
• Type 1: IMS for account management 
• Type 2: IMS for profiling of user data by an organisation 
• Type 3: IMS for user-controlled context-dependent role and pseudonym 
management 
• N/A: Organisation has various offerings or does not engage in IMS 
Class Class of primary eID activity as defined in FIDIS’ categorisation of Identity 
Management Systems (IMS)65: 
• Class 3: Identity management is main functionality (or economic core) of 
the product 
• Class 2: The product is no genuine IMS, but IMS functionality is relevant 
• Class 1: The focus of the product has nothing to do with identity 
management, nevertheless IMS functionality is included 
• Class 0: The corresponding type does not apply to the IMS 
• N/A: Organisation has various offerings 
Employees Total employees in organisation (’000) 
Turnover Annual turnover (€m) 
Established Year organisation was established 
Product/Service 
Names 
Names of key eID products/services offered by the stakeholder 
Technologies Principal eID technologies used by the stakeholder 
Activities Primary eID activities of the stakeholder 
Target Market Primary market (business, government, consumer) 
Position in Value 
Chain 
Levels of the value chain model in which the stakeholder operates (policy / 
regulation / exploitation / infrastructure / technology / support). Where the 
organisation sets or holds technology/interoperability standards, these are 
classified as ‘regulation’. 
Partners Key stakeholder partners 
Key Revenue 
Source 
Description of how the stakeholder generates revenue from eID 
Table 2: Primary analysis headings  
                                                     
64  http://www.fidis.net/interactive/fidis-wiki-on-ims/wiki/Typology%202009/ 
65  http://www.fidis.net/fileadmin/fidis/deliverables/new_deliverables/fidis-wp3-
del3.17_Identity_Management_Systems-recent_developments-final.pdf 
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4.3 Summary of findings 
Thirty-nine stakeholders were identified in the primary analysis, 51 in the secondary analysis. Table 3 
shows the Types and Classifications of those stakeholders as defined in Table 2. 
Percentage Primary Analysis Secondary Analysis 
Type 1 21% 20% 
Type 2 10% 2% 
Type 3 23% 25% 
Type N/A 46% 53% 
Class 0 5% 2% 
Class 1 5% 10% 
Class 2 10% 12% 
Class 3 39% 31% 
Class N/A 41% 45% 
Table 3: Stakeholder analysis by type/class 
 
Whilst there are, for both stakeholder groups, a significant number of organisations that cannot be 
readily assigned a Class or Type, the division is shown in Figure 7. 
  
Figure 7: Stakeholder analysis by type/class 
The vast majority of organisations analysed provide software and services, with other principal 
stakeholder groups covering foundations and research, smartcards, government, data brokerage and 
authentication services, as shown in Table 4. 
Accreditation 
services 1 Payments 1
Authentication 
services 3 
Professional 
services 1 Data brokerage 2 Research 3 
Domain names 1 Government 2 Foundation 4 
Identity services 1 Smartcards 2 Software/services 17 
Legal advice 1    
Table 4: Provision of services by primary stakeholders 
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Consideration was also given to target markets covered by primary stakeholders, as shown in Figure 
8. 
 
Figure 8: Target markets for primary stakeholders 
Consideration of company size vs. type of product/service, and company size vs. importance of eID 
did not reveal any specific findings relevant to the research. 
4.4 The eID ecosystem 
The results of the stakeholder analysis were mapped against a single value chain model to better 
understand where those stakeholders sit in the ecosystem. The ecosystem is shown in Figure 9: 
 
Figure 9: Primary eID stakeholder ecosystem 
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Figure 10 shows the spread of primary stakeholder organisations across the ecosystem; confirming 
that within the sample there are few operating in policy and support services, but a consistent spread 
across other levels of the model. 
 
Figure 10: Division of analysed organisations by position in eID ecosystem 
The ecosystem diagram does not take into account maturity or relative position in the value chain. By 
grouping the stakeholders according to their position, clear eID service groups are revealed, covering 
the areas shown in Table 5: 
Group Description 
Government eID schemes National or regional eID schemes 
Regulation Policy and standard-setting bodies 
Online Consumer services Business to consumer websites 
Legal Counsel Legal support 
Managed eID providers Combined infrastructure/technology as a managed eID service 
Foundations Standard-setting bodies 
Data brokerage Firms gathering, selling or validating personal information 
Smart card providers Smart card manufacturers/vendors 
Backbone providers Organisations providing ‘pervasive’ information technology 
systems and services (e.g. enterprise desktop/server) 
Managed security providers Companies offering security as a service (with associated 
standard-setting or de facto standards) 
System integrators Organisations delivering bespoke enterprise systems 
Sector services Service delivery targeted at specific sectors 
Research Collaborative research and academic projects 
Online/cloud/SaaS Provision of outsourced software services 
Interoperability innovation Firms innovating in new eID applications and standards 
Professional services Consultancy 
Accreditation Certification of eID providers to ensure quality/interoperability
Table 5: eID ecosystem stakeholder groupings 
 
Despite the volume of information collected about eID stakeholders, there was insufficient meaningful 
data to analyse the credential types and maturity in the manner defined in Sections 3.4 to 3.7. We 
anticipate that a significantly larger sample would be required, or that the sample should focus upon a 
single territory or market sector, in order to be able to apply this model to the analysis. 
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5 CREATING VALUE 
5.1 Analysis of company activities 
In the context of the eID ecosystem, value can be added both across the chain, and up and down 
through the layers: that is, as well as transmitting it along the chain, stakeholders can exploit added 
value by building on work on one level to move it to another (as is shown in Figure 11). For example, 
by taking eID technologies and building them into an infrastructure, a vendor may create a value-
added service. Likewise, taking policy or regulation developments may allow a vendor to exploit these 
into a new service offering. 
 
Figure 11: eID added/transmitted value 
To develop this analysis further, the main activities of each company have been classified along this 
value chain. For each company included in the primary analysis, we have placed their three main 
activities in the most appropriate place in the model. While in a few cases it may be somewhat 
difficult to determine the most appropriate place for the concerned activity, in most cases it is a 
relatively straightforward process. The result of this analysis is shown in Figure 12, with each 
company represented by a particular colour (except for organisations which are only active within one 
segment), and in Figure 13, which groups together similar activities within each layer of the value 
chain. Figure 13 also introduces an additional element: the grouping of activities according to their 
degree of "sophistication", i.e. the degree to which they are composed of more applied services and/or 
the degree to which there are more basic services nedeed in that segment of the value chain.  
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Figure 12: eID stakeholder activities in the value chain. 
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Figure 13: eID stakeholder activities in the value chain, grouped by activity 
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5.1.1 Types of company activities 
We can draw several conclusions from the above value chains. First, it can be seen that most activities 
take place in the exploitation and infrastructure layers. The prevalence of exploitation products and 
services may reflect a certain degree of maturity in the marketplace: the underlying technologies are 
developed enough so that companies are able to create value-added services on top of them. For 
instance, different certification, antifraud and identity management services offered by the companies 
are all based on relatively robust identification technologies. The infrastructure products and services 
also rely on the availability of more fundamental technology solutions. 
The technologies segment itself is somewhat smaller than the two above it. This may be due to the 
higher degree of technical expertise required by this segment of the value chain. Another possibility is 
the smaller size of the market, though lack of quantifiable data makes it difficult to say. Nevertheless, 
we can see that a variety of technological solutions are offered by the stakeholders such as: SSO 
(single sign-on), public key infrastructure (PKI), smart card products. 
Clearly the smallest sections are policy and regulation, which is understandable given that these are 
typically not easily combined with other activities and are often composed of activities such as legal 
counsel or standardisation. Indeed, many of the organisations in these segments are not companies at 
all, but standardisation bodies or government departments. Nonetheless, this segment is vital for the 
industry as a whole since it provides the link between the core of the marketplace (the various 
technological and commercial solutions) and the public sphere, with its policy and regulatory 
activities. 
It is also noticeable that a typical combination of products is either exploitation and infrastructure, or 
infrastructure and technologies. The provision of these kinds of services often complements each 
other; for example, by providing a technology infrastructure (or platform) an organisation may then 
find other uses for it or offer consultation services based on it; while a technology provider may be 
able to easily construct a more sophisticated infrastructure on top of it. Policy and regulation are much 
more specific services, which explains why they do not often go together with other layers, though in 
the case of government services, for example, there may be some correlation. 
In some cases, we can notice companies operating in three separate segments. This is typically the 
case with large companies such as RSA Security, Oracle, or Microsoft. They are often able to leverage 
their existing offerings to cover a wide swathe of the value chain, and with a small or moderate 
additional investment expand into new segments. Many of these players may also try to actively 
connect their products and services in the different segments, thus seeking synergies and possibilities 
to offer significant added value to the client. For the smaller companies, the situation is different as 
they have more limited resources (financing, technical abilities, number of staff) at their disposal. 
Thus they may be forced to concentrate on one highly tailored product/service or business model, or to 
seek opportunities to exploit already existing infrastructure to facilitate their service provision. 
It is also noteworthy that there are several companies offering consultation services in the eID market. 
On the one hand, this may show that the market is mature enough to allow the emergence of specific 
services designed to help companies better exploit the new opportunities offered by developments in 
eID. On the other hand, it may equally well be the case that there is so far too limited an understanding 
of how electronic identity based services could be commercialised, what opportunities and pitfalls 
there are, and how the industry is developing. At any rate, the emergence of consulting services shows 
that at least among some stakeholders there is an improving understanding of the industry. 
5.1.2 Clustering of activities 
If we then look at how activities are clustered within the segments, the following developments can be 
noted. First, in the policy and regulation layers the activities are quite dispersed. This is mostly due to 
the variety of activities within the segments. Standardisation organisations such as OASIS, W3C and 
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Liberty Alliance can, however, be loosely grouped together. Moreover, BankID and BBS both offer 
identity solutions for government transactions. Both of them have been developed for use by the 
public and companies in the marketplace as well as government organisations, which distinguishes 
them from other similar services. In addition, FieldFisherWaterhouse and Kantara are both active in 
the legal layer, albeit with different operational foci. Finally, Ctrl-Shift and RSA Security offer more 
advanced accordingly tailored services that seek to identify the particular problems and challenges that 
their customer companies face, and respond with concepts and advice.  
In the exploitation section, we can see several service groups. Several institutions (Verizon, Verisign, 
Microsoft, FINEID, TU Dresden) offer certification and ID management services that verify the 
validity of the identities provided by other stakeholders. This function is fundamental in the sense that 
without reliable certificates, the other, more applied activities in this section cannot be realised. An 
example of this is the next cluster, where companies such as Arcot, IdenTrust and Oracle offer anti-
fraud solutions addressing the growing threat of identity theft and abuse of electronic identities. 
Service solutions such as these utilise the identity and certification services offered by other 
companies, aiming to prevent the unauthorised use of existing identities and the use of false identities 
by using the established certificates as their starting point. A third major sector is the consulting 
services; while there is much more variation within this sector, all the companies seek to help their 
customers get the highest possible added value out of their portfolios by using them more efficiently or 
by introducing new, compatible services. 
In the infrastructure section, the services offered tend to be more broadly defined or to be composed of 
a variety of elements. This makes it more challenging to group activities to specific clusters. However, 
we can still identify certain clusters of activities. Firstly, several organisations offer basic 
infrastructure or networking services, which are necessary to enable access to the more advanced 
services. Further, we can distinguish between encryption and authentication services: encryption 
merely packages the information into a secure format so it can only be accessed by appropriate 
stakeholders, while authentication includes the recognition and cross-checking of identity data used by 
individuals seeking to access a service.  
In the technology section, where fewer companies participate, we can more readily divide it into 
groups as it is more clearly defined. There are a number of companies (CoreStreet, HP Labs, 
IdenTrust) offering public key infrastructure (PKI) technologies that create the actual keys and 
identification mechanisms used in the authentication. Further, there are five companies that offer 
specific authentication technologies such as SSO (single sign-on) and strong authentication. Finally, 
both Giesecke & Devrient and Gemalto offer smart cards and associated card readers and software. 
Since their portfolio includes a physical product, the smart card, as well as software, the complexity 
and thus the added value of the activities increase significantly. 
Table 6 groups together the activities in each section of the value chain, highlighting the different 
service clusters. 
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Table 6: eID ecosystem stakeholder activities by segment of value chain and type of service 
Layer Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Others 
Policy Policy support Data collection and 
management 
  
 UK Cabinet Office Acxiom – Gov't eID    
 UK Home Office    
Regulation Standardisation Transactions Legal Advisory / services 
 W3C – Web 
standards organstion 
BankID – ID for 
gov't transactions 
FieldFisherWaterhou
se – Legal counsel 
Ctrl-Shift – Advising  
 OASIS  BBS – ID for gov't 
transactions 
Kantara – Legal, 
privacy, tools 
RSA Security – 
Qualified services 
 Liberty Alliance    
Exploitation Certification Antifraud Consultation Applied services 
 Verizon – 
Certification services 
Arcot – Online fraud 
prevention 
Deloitte – System 
integration, 
consulting 
Acxiom – Marketing 
databases 
 Verisign – Identity 
protection 
IdenTrust – 
AntiFraud  
eBay – Online 
consultation 
PayPal – Online 
payment 
 Microsoft – Network 
access 
Oracle – Fraud 
detection 
SAP Research – 
Consult, development 
Equifax – Credit 
Management 
 TU Dresden – ID 
management 
  RSA Security – 
Software  
 FINEID – 
Certification 
  University College 
London 
    tScheme 
Infrastructure Network Encryption Authentication Services 
 Verizon – 
Infrastructure 
PGP – Mobile 
encryption 
Verisign – Enterprise 
authentication 
PayPal – Mobile 
services 
 IdenTrust – 
Infrastructure 
PGP – Endpoint 
encryption 
BT – Authentication 
and authorisation  
Giesecke & Devrient 
– Services 
 HP Labs – 
Infrastructure 
TU Dresden – 
Anonymisation 
BankID – ID for 
online banking 
Symantec – 
Consulting  
 SAP Research – 
Hosting  
 BBS – ID for online 
banking 
RSA Security - 
Training 
 IBM – Managed ID 
service 
 Equifax – Identity 
protection 
 
 Microsoft – Web 
access management 
 Oracle – Federated 
identity 
 
 Fun Communications 
– Engineering 
 CoreStreet – Physical 
access control 
 
 STORK    
Technologies Public key infra-
structure (PKI) 
Authentication 
technologies 
Smart cards Services 
 CoreStreet – PKI, 
gov't eID systems 
Arcot – Strong 
authentication, 
eDocument security 
Gemalto – Smart 
cards, readers, 
software 
PayPal – top-up card 
 HP Labs – PKI, 
biometrics 
Verisign – Individual 
authentication 
Giesecke & Devrient, 
Smart cards, readers 
 
 IdenTrust – PKI Microsoft – Strong 
authentication 
  
  Oracle – SSO    
  BT – SSO, eID 
verify. 
  
Support Others Others   
 Ascio – Web ID & 
access services 
Acxiom – ID risk 
management 
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5.1.3 Linkages between segments of the value chain 
It is also possible to identify several linkages between the different segments of the value chain. These 
linkages can be roughly grouped according to types of services they are associated with; the first of the 
linkages is clustered around government services and their supporting services. Different government 
departments (i.e. UK Home Office, UK Cabinet Office) and government eIdentity managers (i.e. 
Acxiom) are all involved in generating and maintaining eID information to be able to provide the 
policy support functions required of them. These stakeholders typically rely on lower-level services 
provided by companies such BBS and BankID, which offer identification services specifically for 
governmental transactions. In turn, these companies utilise certification and antifraud services from 
the exploitation layer, and authentication and authorisation services from the infrastructure layer, to 
provide the actual technical means for securely identifying the users for different kinds of use cases, 
environments and transactions. Antifraud and identity protection services are often especially 
important in the case of governmental services, due to the often very large sums of money and 
confidential nature of the information concerned. Finally, governmental organisations rely on 
companies such as CoreStreet to provide the technological base, e.g. in the form of the physical 
infrastructure, for the identification systems. 
A second linkage between layers of the value chain can be seen in what could be called commercial 
add-on services. Prime examples of these include marketing databases (Acxiom), credit management 
(Equifax) and online payment (PayPal). These exploitation-layer services make use of identification 
methods and technologies provided by other stakeholders, and create their own tailored products on 
top of them. Typically, the supporting infrastructure is composed of different authentication and 
encryption services, as well as access management and hosting solutions. The actual technologies used 
very much depend on the add-on service in question, but in many cases, single sign-on and/or strong 
authentication methods come in useful; in some cases, smart cards and their readers (provided by 
companies such as Gemalto and Giesecke & Devrient) may also be used as the means of 
identification. 
A third group is the various soft services that use the different technical solutions just as the first 
building block of their services. In the regulation layer, these include legal counsel and advisory 
services (FieldFisherWaterhouse, Kantara, Ctrl-Shift). In the exploitation and infrastructure layers, 
typical soft services are consultation, training, and management services, offered by the likes of 
Deloitte, SAP, and Symantec. Key features of these services are a high added value, often enabling 
companies offering them to charge a premium for the services, and a high degree of flexibility in 
tailoring the services to match the needs of the individual customers. The technologies layer is less 
relevant in the case of soft services, but companies such as Acxiom in the support layer can be very 
important in providing the appropriate level and type of risk management for other companies. 
As an example of existing linkages between companies, IdenTrust operates in many markets together 
with RSA Security, CoreStreet and Gemalto. The main activity of IdenTrust is offering authentication 
systems for the finance sector. Their system is based on PKI-based credentials that allow stakeholders 
in the financial sector to securely and reliably carry out large-scale transactions. However, since 
IdenTrust does not have all necessary competencies in-house, they partner with the three companies to 
be able to offer a full service to their customers. In this case, all the supporting companies have a quite 
clearly defined role: RSA Security offers high-level services (i.e. consultation and training) to help 
companies make the most of the eID system, CoreStreet is the company that controls the physical 
access to the system, while Gemalto provides the software that carries out the operations required by 
the system specifications. 
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5.2 Individual companies 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Private-sector activities deliver eID credentials that are immediately usable as products or services, 
given that there is a need for a clear return on investment. In many cases, they build upon the work of 
research projects and standards bodies. This section describes a number of notable private-sector eID 
schemes in an attempt to single out characteristics that may be useful for further analysis of the eID 
sector value-chain and operative business models.  
5.2.2 BBS Global Validation Service 
Acting as a “trust anchor”, BBS Global Validation Service66 helps customer organisations to manage 
risks associated with the acceptance of digital signatures and certificates while conducting global e-
business. Owned by Nordic financial institutions, BBS is a leading provider of identity, banking, 
payments and information services, and works in partnership with solution providers and managed 
security providers. Key services include Managed PKI (on a national scale), managed one-time 
passwords, global validation, eArchiving, eInvoicing and eWorkflow. Technologies used by BBS 
include PKI, smartcards and tokens. BBS has operated national critical financial infrastructures since 
1972 and identity solutions since 2000.  
The validation service manages the process of verifying digital signatures and validating digital 
certificates (eIDs). The service relies on a risk-based assessment of credential quality and is currently 
in use by the Norwegian government procurement portal (HANDEL). The fact that these services are 
accepted by several governments in addition to the marketplace distinguishes the BBS service offering 
from other similar ones. This has the potential to be quite a significant development, given that 
governments in general are very wary of accepting commercial credentials and instead prefer to rely 
on their own solutions. As the security standards of the commercial products are constantly improving, 
this lack of acceptance may be more of an issue of suitability of commercial credentials for 
governmental purposes, rather than concerns about their lack of reliability. 
In general terms, international companies need to handle the complexity of verifying different kinds of 
signatures and to validate certificates from various issuers worldwide. This is the main challenge that 
BBS seeks to address. They offer validation services that seek to solve the complex problem of 
offering signature verification and certificate validation as a service for the receiving party. In this 
way, their customer can obtain a solution designed to manage different signatures and certificates 
worldwide. Effective use of digital signatures, especially across national frontiers, reduces costs and 
complexity of using PKI in global e-business. The service also effectively helps to connect different 
closed eID communities. Ultimately, BBS aims to function as a single, independent trust provider, 
which offers one set of standards and one software package for processing of signatures and 
certificates, as well as effective risk management for using PKI in global business transactions. 
BBS operates in two distinct segments of the eIdentity market: they offer multi-purpose ID schemes 
for heterogeneous citizen-merchant markets, and tailored PKI solutions, with more stringent security 
parameters, whose users are typically enterprise customers with transactions taking place in closed 
environments.67 The most important product of BBS is the Identity Management Platform. Developed 
in 2008, it is used for issuing, managing and using digital certificates online. It can handle different 
Certificate Authority (CA) platforms and validation technologies, thereby providing BBS with the 
flexibility to adapt their certification to the specific needs of individual customers and transactions. 
The BBS Identity Manager is used to provide all their electronic ID services, including enterprise PKI, 
mobile PKI, EU-qualified (BBS PKI has been established in the EU-Compliant Qualified Certificate 
environment, allowing enterprises all over Europe to get PKI services and qualified certificates) and 
                                                     
66  http://www.bbs-nordic.com/en/Solutions-and-Services/eSecurity/Global-Validation-Service/ 
67  B. Choudhary, "European e-ID services: future trends and Nordic experiences," FST Europe (GDS 
Publishing Ltd., 2010), vol. 
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standard certificates. It can also be used to provide one-time passwords and validation of individual 
transactions. The BBS services allow for the use of identity in context- and transaction-specific ways, 
utilising different types and levels of security for specific use cases. In general, BBS services have 
been developed with a modular design, allowing their customers to choose the combination of 
identification mechanisms that is most appropriate for their needs.  
The market activities of BBS are complemented by their participation in international standardisation 
and expert groups such as European Committee for Banking Standards (ECBS; Mobile Payments 
Workgroup), Mobey Forum (Mobile Authentication and Business Ecosystem), and European Payment 
Council (EPC). The participation in these bodies helps BBS to develop identity solutions that better 
address specific privacy and data protection issues, in addition to having a hand in shaping the future 
development of the eID industry. 
 
Figure 12: BBS Value Chain 
An alternative way to analyse the activities of BBS (as well as other companies) is according to a 
business model framework developed by Osterwalder (2004),68 where the elements underpinning the 
operations of a company are divided into nine categories. Below we present the nine categories and 
the way in which the BBS operations fit into them, displayed graphically in the following Figure 15.  
• Customer segments – Who does the company create value for? BBS: Government 
departments, financial institutions, other private stakeholders who require reliable 
identification and validation services. 
• Value proposition – What does the company offer to the market? BBS: Solution to the 
complexity problem of verifying different kinds of signatures and validating certificates from 
various issuers worldwide. 
• Distribution channels – Which communication and distribution channels do the products and 
services reach the market through? BBS: Works as an independent trust provider whose 
products come in a modular design, meaning that their customers are able to purchase the type 
and level of service they need. 
                                                     
68  Osterwalder, Alexander (2004). The Business Model Ontology: A Proposition in a Design Science 
Approach. PhD thesis, University of Lausanne. 
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Figure 13: BBS Business Model 
• Customer relationship – Which different customer relationships are developed and maintained 
in the business model? BBS: Offers security as a service, aiming at two separate segments of 
the eIdentity market: ID schemes for heterogeneous citizen-merchant markets and tailored PKI 
solutions for closed environments. 
• Revenue streams – What are the key sources of revenue for the company? BBS: Revenues 
come in from customer organisations purchasing the product modules that fit their particular 
needs. 
• Core capabilities – What are the key resources and capabilities of the company? BBS: Identity 
Management Platform, the ability to issue, manage and use digital certificates online, 
managing the use of identity in context- and transaction-specific ways. 
• Value configuration – What are the main activities of the company that contribute to 
generating value? BBS: Managed PKI, managed one-time passwords, global validation, 
eArchiving, eInvoicing and eWorkflow. 
• Partner network – Which partners does the company work together with? BBS: Participates in 
international expert groups such as European Committee for Banking Standards, Mobey 
Forum and European Payment Council. 
• Cost structure – What are the most important cost elements for the company? BBS: Personnel 
costs, software development, service setup for customers, service maintenance. 
5.2.3 CoreStreet69 
CoreStreet is a US-based company delivering eID validation services at infrastructure and application 
layers in IT and physical security environments. The company operates in the EU through a network 
of partners. Key product areas include: 
                                                     
69  http://www.corestreet.com/ 
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• Public key infrastructure: Certificate validation technologies used to validate credentials of 
individuals for email and secure forms; 
• Physical access control: Integration of physical access control systems with eID systems; 
• Secure ID checking: Provision of technologies and infrastructure to check government ID 
credentials, particularly around ‘first responders’ in incident management and crisis control 
scenarios. 
CoreStreet's aim is to improve security, speed, and efficiency in critical day-to-day applications, 
including PKI-based IT security, physical access control, and secure ID checking. CoreStreet 
technology, along with CoreStreet-compatible products and services from partners and integrators, are 
designed to facilitate the convergence of physical and IT security systems. CoreStreet products 
perform the twin functions of authentication (is the person or organization who he says he is) and 
validation (is the person or organization allowed to do what he is doing at this particular moment). 
As to PKI services, CoreStreet’s certificate validation technology is currently deployed by the US 
Department of Defense and other organizations, public and private, around the globe. The CoreStreet 
technology is designed to validate the credentials of individuals as they interact with IT applications 
with a security component, including digitally signed email and secure forms. In doing so, users and 
administrators can have the highest level of trust in their secure communications and transactions. 
Based on the work of Dr. Silvio Micali, an MIT professor on cryptography, the CoreStreet PKI 
technology enables credential validation quickly in both online and offline environments. Examples of 
credential types include smart cards, ePassports, and driver's licenses. 
As to physical access control, CoreStreet's Card-Connected technology is used to enhance the capacity 
of physical security products from infrastructure vendors. By integrating CoreStreet technology, 
companies are able to deliver solutions to their customers that increase the scope of any physical 
access system by allowing centralised management of both wired and standalone locations. In 
addition, CoreStreet technologies can be used to enable one-card access to all systems. CoreStreet's 
physical access systems represent a novel approach to security by utilising advanced smart cards that 
act as a network between wired and standalone locations. 
As to mobile identity validation, CoreStreet offers the PIVMAN solution, which is a system for 
checking secure government IDs such as the government issued smart cards, ePassports, or driver's 
licenses in locations where network connectivity is either unavailable or difficult to obtain. Consisting 
of handhelds, desktops, and servers, the CoreStreet PIVMAN Solution is an end-to-end mobile 
identity verification solution that requires no network connectivity in order to check the validity of a 
credential. Applications include incident response, natural disaster, and border control. 
5.2.4 Gemalto 
Gemalto is a leading provider of security devices including smartcards, SIMs, e-passports, tokens and 
the necessary backbone services to manage these devices. The company is particularly engaged in 
public sector activities with more than 20 ePassport initiatives, 15 national eID programs, and various 
eHealth and e-driving/smart transport schemes. Gemalto operates worldwide from its home territory in 
France, using direct sales or partner organisations, in a model that varies according to local conditions. 
Technologies in use include polycarbonate or PVC contact/contactless smartcards, with Java and 
match-on-card biometric systems. 
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Figure 14: Gemalto Value Chain 
5.2.5 IdenTrust  
IdenTrust70 is a bank-developed PKI authentication system that is primarily used by the finance sector 
and is recognised by government agencies and corporations around the world. IdenTrust issues 
credentials and provides a supporting infrastructure that incorporates policies, legal framework, 
operations and technology to facilitate authentication, encryption and digital signing between 
organisations. The company is headquartered in the US, but provides services to financial institutions 
across Europe. 
The IdenTrust Trust Network, which is their main product, provides both hosting and connectivity for 
authentication between institutions, for which participating institutions pay a joining fee, an annual 
subscription and a ‘per-transaction’ charge. The system forms part of the UK Critical National 
Infrastructure, for example in support of ACH BACSTel IP which handles direct debits and credits. In 
the US, IdenTrust provides digital certificates to the US Federal Government and is involved in the 
ACES/ECA programmes (critical infrastructure). 
The IdenTrust credentials are designed to provide three key capabilities: authentication (provision of 
identity), encryption (safeguarding content, eliminating unauthorised access) and digital signature 
(user-level signatures of specific transactions). In addition, IdenTrust credentials are designed to 
comply with relevant anti-money laundering or other anti-abuse regulations (i.e. Sarbanes-Oxley and 
HIPAA health data regulations).  
IdenTrust products enable companies make authentication an integral part of their business processes 
and so to be able to conduct their operations reliably and securely over the Internet beyond fulfilling 
their legal obligations. IdenTrust products rely on an open standard that can be used by financial 
institutions to gain interoperability and legal acceptance in 120 countries. The membership of the 
IdenTrust network is restricted to institutions that agree to abide by the conditions set by IdenTrust, 
thereby ensuring that the standard is utilised in an appropriate manner. IdenTrust policies govern who 
receives the identity and how each individual or business is vetted to guarantee they really are who 
they say they are, along with making certain that the process is done consistently everywhere around 
the world. IdenTrust identities encrypt and control the process flows, in order to prevent the 
interception or redirection of a transaction or a document, in this way combating phishing and man-in-
the-middle attacks. 
                                                     
70  http://www.identrust.com/ 
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The Trust Network work flows as follows.71 It first specifies how a digital identity certificate can be 
issued and how it is validated. The transaction data and signed certificate are exchanged between the 
stakeholders involved in the transaction. The messages related to the transaction data are exchanged 
between the customers on either end of the transaction. IdenTrust only validates the identities used by 
these customers, not the data associated with the transaction. The transaction data itself is never passed 
to IdenTrust; the only information IdenTrust receives and sends back to the banks is validation of 
participant identities. All individuals and systems using the network are identified using IdenTrust 
digital certificates. 
 
Figure 15: Functioning of IdenTrust Trust Network   (Source: IdenTrust, ref. #78) 
Overall, IdenTrust supplies the technology and legal mechanisms to allow companies to trust that their 
Internet trading partners are who they claim to be. The provision of verifiable identities makes it less 
risky for companies to operate over the Internet, hence reducing transaction costs and creating 
auditable records of their transactions. This means that IdenTrust products and services have an 
important role in supporting growth in the eIdentity market, even if the products are initially 
considered as simply a cost for the customer companies.72 
 
                                                     
71  IdenTrust. The IdenTrust Rule Set:Providing Secure Identities While Protecting Privacy. (White Paper). 
London: IdenTrust, 2007. Available from 
<http://www.identrust.com/pdf/IdenTrust_Privacy_WhitePaper.pdf>. 
72  IdenTrust. Identity Authentication as a Critical Growth Strategy. (White Paper). London: IdenTrust, 2007. 
Available from <http://www.identrust.com/pdf/Identity_Authentication_CriticalGrowth.pdf>. 
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Figure 16: IdenTrust Value Chain 
Given the wide range and complexity of IdenTrust's operations, we classify them below according to 
the Osterwalder model (see Section 6.2.1 and resulting graph in figure 19).  
• Customer segments – Who does the company create value for? IdenTrust: UK government 
(forms part of UK Critical National Infrastructure), US government, financial institutions, 
corporations who need reliable and legally binding global authentication. 
• Value proposition – What does the company offer to the market? IdenTrust: Enables 
organisations to conduct transactions electronically with an appropriate degree of reliability 
and security, providing verifiable identities to the participants of the transaction. 
• Distribution channels – Which communication and distribution channels do the products and 
services reach the market through? IdenTrust: Utilises an open standard whose users agree to 
abide by a set of rules specified by IdenTrust. 
• Customer relationship – Which different customer relationships are developed and maintained 
in the business model? IdenTrust: Customers are able to operate as members of the Trust 
Network, which guarantees that all members follow the same set of rules, thus promoting 
interoperability and generating trust in the market. 
• Revenue streams – What are the key sources of revenue for the company? IdenTrust: Joining 
fee to the Trust Network, annual subscription fee, individual transaction charges. 
• Core capabilities – What are the key resources and capabilities of the company? IdenTrust: 
Provides three key services: authentication (provision of identity), encryption (safeguarding 
content), and digital signing (user-level signatures of specific transactions). 
• Value configuration – What are the main activities of the company that contribute to 
generating value? IdenTrust: Creating credentials, reducing transaction costs and creating an 
auditable record of transactions. 
• Partner network – Which partners does the company work together with? IdenTrust: All the 
companies accepting the shared set of rules of the Trust Network. 
• Cost structure – What are the most important cost elements for the company? IdenTrust: 
Personnel costs, hardware costs, software development, service setup for customers, service 
maintenance. 
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Figure 17: IdenTrust Business Model 
5.2.6 RSA Security 
Forming the Information Security Division of EMC73 Corporation, RSA is one of the oldest providers 
of Information Security systems, services and support and has its roots in the synonymous algorithm 
(now reportedly embedded in over 1bn products worldwide). The 2000 employee division, 
headquartered in the USA with a significant presence in Europe, today provides encryption, 
authentication, access management, security information and event management and fraud control 
products, as well as consulting and professional services to over 35,000 organisations. Its technologies 
are used to protect 250m online Identities worldwide, in online banking and credit card transactions 
(via the provision of Verified by Visa74 / Mastercard SecureCode75 security systems) 
RSA's range of technology, business and industry solutions are coupled with professional services as 
well as strategic partnerships with the relevant stakeholders in the industry. Furthermore, since 
companies must today fulfill a wide variety of regulatory requirements and recommendations that 
demand rigorous protection of identities and information, RSA provides services for helping their 
customer companies meet compliance requirements such as with the European Data Privacy Directive, 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the ISO 27002 Standard and a variety 
of other US legislative measures. 
RSA works throughout the eID value chain, from CA activities through to provision of a wide variety 
of authentication methods, including both software-based and hardware tokens. Strategically they 
anticipate a move away from perimeter centric and static security (e.g. tokens, PKI) to a more 
information centric and risk-based security, that analyse a host of parameters (e.g. IP address, machine 
characteristics, user behaviour) to make an optimal authentication choice, rather than the traditional 
                                                     
73  http://www.emc.com/ 
74  http://www.visaeurope.com/merchant/handlingvisapayments/cardnotpresent/verifiedbyvisa.jsp 
75  http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholderservices/securecode/index.html 
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binary ‘yes/no’ associated with authentication. In addition, it offers RSA SecurID USB Tokens76 
which combine a USB device with secure storage of digital credentials thus consolidating digital 
credentials onto a single device. 
RSA provides solutions that apply appropriate controls to mitigate risk according to the value and 
criticality of data, applications, identities and transactions. With a range of identity assurance products, 
organizations can leverage information and new electronic applications to accelerate their business 
initiatives. Identity assurance products also support an information risk management process by 
helping define and enforce policy around users and access and providing the technology controls to 
mitigate risks related to unauthorized access. Overall, identity assurance products create trust by 
defining identity policy, verifying new identities and managing credential issuance. They also manage 
authentication, provide context for what a trusted identity can do, provide knowledge back to the 
enterprise of what an identity has done, alert on suspicious activity, and elaborate information on 
possible emerging threats.77 
A significant part of RSA operations is the RSA Secured technology partner program. It is composed 
of over 1,000 strategic partnerships with relevant organizations, through which RSA is able to 
integrate its solutions into many diverse environments. The program focuses on interoperability 
certification activities as well as joint support strategies. Certification brings added assurance to 
customers that the solutions RSA provides are interoperable with industry-leading security products so 
that they can achieve faster time to deployment and lower total cost of ownership. In addition, RSA 
plays an active leadership role in standards development initiatives – such as Liberty Alliance, OASIS, 
IETF and WS-Security – to ensure the technical superiority and interoperability of their solutions. 
Their current portfolio supports a multitude of standards, including PKCS, RADIUS and SAML. One 
of the most important departments of RSA Security is RSA Laboratories,78 which are researching 
enhanced user authentication techniques, RFID privacy and security, mobile phone personal 
authentication and cloud storage. 
 
 
Figure 18: RSA Value Chain 
5.2.7 BankID 
The company, Financial ID-Technology, provides the service of electronic identities using the PKI 
technology to banks in Sweden. BankID79 is the leading electronic identity in Sweden with a market 
share of 75%. BankID has been developed by a number of large banks for use by members of the 
                                                     
76 http://www.rsa.com/products/securid/datasheets/2305_SID_DS_0709.pdf 
77  RSA-Security. Implementing Identity Assurance for Business Acceleration. (White paper), 2008. Available 
from <http://www.rsa.com/solutions/technology/overview/IA_OV_0208-final.pdf>. 
78  http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/ 
79  http://www.bankid.com/en/What-is-BankID/ 
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public, authorities and companies. The services vary from online banking, e-trade to tax declaration 
and are provided by government, municipality, banks and companies. BankID is used both for 
identification as well as electronically signing. The customer's identification is guaranteed by the bank 
issuing the BankID. According to Swedish law, signatures with BankID are legally binding within the 
EU. BankID is available on smart card, soft certificate and since 2010 on mobile phones (mobile 
BankID).  
The first BankID was issued in 2003. At the moment 9 banks acts as issuers (Certification Authorities) 
of BankID to their customers. Together they represent about 5.6 million online bankers (Sweden has 
about 7.3 million citizens above the age of 18). BankID illustrates the potential of crossover between 
banking credentials and public sector services; the most important element underpinning this potential 
is its liability model. 
5.2.8 VeriSign 
VeriSign is one of the world's largest providers of authentication and certification services based on 
PKI technologies. They and their partners provide Domain Naming System (DNS), Secure Socket 
Layer (SSL), Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and other authentication services. At the moment, 
VeriSign facilitates up to 50 billion DNS queries a day. Their service offering includes global 
registries, data centres, and infrastructure whose aim is to provide secure and scalable authentication 
services worldwide. One product area of particular interest in the eID arena is Verisign’s National PKI 
Program.80 This is designed to provide an infrastructure for the creation of PKI schemes at a national 
level, and is being promoted – particularly in the US – as the foundation for an open eID scheme. The 
company is worldwide, with European headquarters in Geneva, and offices in the U.K., Sweden, 
Switzerland. Products and services include PKI, Fraud Detection Service (FDS), and One-Time-
Password (OTP) software, services. 
The VeriSign product offering covers four separate areas: 
(a) global registries which are able to store information in secure and easily accessible formats. The 
registries provide a certifiable record of all contents, enabling companies to monitor and record 
how and by whom the data are accessed and used. The key registries offered by VeriSign are the 
Global Domain Name Registry (stores IP addresses and domain names, facilitating service to 
Internet, email, FTP and other addresses), the Network Routing Directory (a master repository 
of subscriber and network information), and the Object Naming Service (stores critical 
information that allows authorized individuals to track products across global supply chains 
using RFID and other tags).  
(b) different types of networks that allow their customer companies to transfer information securely 
and reliably, using different protocols and physical infrastructure. The Signaling System 7 (SS7) 
Network, enables the provision of advanced digital services among different types of companies, 
including telephone operators, cable operators, ISPs, wireless providers, and wired/wireless 
advanced digital network database providers. 
(c) data centres that provide the physical security and backup capabilities required from the 
infrastructure. VeriSign maintains a number of data centres providing different services such as 
monitoring the global DNS systems, managing customer networks, hosting Internet and 
telecommunications systems, and monitoring and securing network traffic.81 
(d) a single platform for provisioning, managing and using multiple authentication credentials 
named VeriSign Unified Authentication82. The platform supports strong authentication using 
smart cards, the Secure Storage Token, the USB Token, a device-generated One-Time Password 
(OTP) Token and digital certificates. It also supports PKI-based encryption, digital signing, and 
non-repudiation. 
                                                     
80  http://www.verisign.com/static/national-pki-government-trust.pdf 
81  VeriSign, "VeriSign Internet Infrastructure: An Overview," (2007), vol. 
82  http://www.verisign.com.au/guide/unified-authentication/uniauth_datasheet.pdf 
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Overall, VeriSign enables companies and consumers rely on an Internet infrastructure that lets them 
communicate and conduct commerce with confidence. For this purpose, they provide encryption and 
authentication services to Web sites, intranets, and extranets, protect digital identities with strong 
authentication mechanisms, develop online fraud detection services, as well as maintain the 
authoritative registry of all .com, .net, .cc, and .tv domain names. 
 
Figure 19: Verisign Value Chain 
5.2.9 Giesecke & Devrient83 
Giesecke & Devrient (G&D) is a leading international technology provider and a global market leader 
and pioneering innovator in banknote production and processing, smart card solutions for 
telecommunications and electronic payment, and security documents and identification systems, 
headquartered in Munich, Germany . In the eID market, their products can be divided into three main 
groups: smart cards, management of personal data, and security solutions: 
(a) smart cards, manufactured by G&D, are used worldwide in various environments. G&D 
provides end-to-end solutions in the intelligent debit and credit cards area, for instance. G&D 
smart cards, based on secure smart card operating systems and conforming to the latest EMV 
standards, can incorporate different applications on a single smart card adding features and extra 
applications to existing payment cards of various kinds. 
(b) means for the secure acquisition and processing of personal data. G&D equips passports, ID 
cards, health care cards, and driver’s licenses with sophisticated security features to prevent their 
misuse, and also enables the use of integrated chips, which may also contain biometric data, in 
these cards to provide additional security. Such products follow the requirements of EC 
Directive CEN TC 224 WG15, which describes a universal standard for security and data 
protection on the so-called European Citizen Card (ECC). The ECC standard ensures easier 
access to e-government and local administrative services by citizens, through the use of IAS 
services (identification, authentication, digital signature).  
(c) integrated systems and solutions for network authentication, e-mail encryption, and single sign-
on. G&D also offer security solutions for protecting brands and sensitive documents.  
5.2.10 PGP Corporation84 
PGP Corporation is a US-based company that specializes in email and data encryption software used 
for data protection in both fixed and mobile environments. The most important part of the PGP 
product offering is the PGP Encryption Platform, which provides a single, scalable architecture for 
addressing privacy and data protection issues while reducing IT operational costs. Unlike point 
                                                     
83  http://www.gi-de.com/ 
84  http://www.pgp.com/ 
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solutions that address specific threats, the PGP Encryption Platform delivers an integrated encryption 
framework across a broad range of encryption applications. 
Based on a unified key management and policy infrastructure, the PGP Encryption Platform offers a 
set of integrated applications for enterprise data security. PGP platform-enabled applications allow 
organizations to address current needs and expand as security requirements change for email, laptops, 
desktops, instant messaging, smart phones, network storage, file transfers, automated processes, and 
backups. This approach enables IT to develop a proactive encryption strategy to mitigate risks before 
they affect operations or threaten the corporate brand and reputation. PGP encryption solutions are 
currently used by more than 110,000 enterprises, businesses, and governments worldwide. Customers 
use PGP solutions as part of a regulatory and audit compliance solution, to protect confidential 
information, secure customer data, and safeguard companies' brands and reputations.  
5.2.11 Arcot Systems85 
Arcot Systems is a US-based company that offers online fraud prevention, strong authentication and 
eDocument security solutions. Their products and services are used to prevent fraud and identity theft 
in Internet transactions and online access by over 100 million consumer, enterprise and e-Commerce 
users. Financial institutions, pharmaceutical companies, eShopping sites are some of the most 
important sectors that use Arcot's solutions. Arcot aims to make their solutions easily deployed, low-
cost, and highly scalable; this entails enabling organizations to protect their users from fraud without 
changing user behavior or requiring expensive hardware.  
Organizations can deploy Arcot solutions either in the cloud (through remote hosting) or on the 
premises of the customer company, addressing its particular requirements for cost, convenience, and 
level of security. Arcot's services are hosted in a certified, PCI DSS-compliant data center, which 
provides the highest level of cloud security currently standardized by the industry. Arcot offers a two-
factor authentication software-only midrange solution86 called WebFort, designed to deliver a balance 
of cost, convenience, and strength for a lower cost of ownership than alternative solutions. This can be 
achieved through the use of the ArcotID which is a software credential which combines the protection 
for digital IDs (like a hardware smartcard) with the lower cost and simplicity of a software solution. It 
can be integrated with various existing infrastructures, with support for standards such as RADIUS-
based OTP and PKCS#11. In addition to strong authentication, the ArcotID enables PKI applications 
such as electronic document signing, secure email, and secure ecommerce. 
5.3 Further research to make sense of the eID market 
A number of steps could be taken to enhance our understanding of the functioning and future 
development of the eIdentity market. First, in relation to the economics of the eID market, it would be 
essential to find more quantitative data, both about the individual companies and the market as a 
whole. This would give us an indication of the economic significance of the eID market and the 
relative roles of the various stakeholders. However, this kind of research would constitute a very 
significant additional effort, both in terms of resources and time. 
From a more theoretical perspective, we think that economics of identity can be understood according 
to four distinct schools of thought. Each of these four schools allocates specific dynamics to 
economics of identity; we believe that these dynamics should be mapped out and their impact on how 
the eIdentity market functions should be researched. Based on this work, the ensemble of company 
activities could then be studied according to each school of thought as appropriate. The four schools of 
thought are identity as a consumption good, identity as a capital asset, identity as a social good, and 
identity simply as a cost. The first possibility, identity as a consumption good, means that users 
                                                     
85  http://www.arcot.com/ 
86  In between simple, inexpensive but insecure, traditional username/password mechanisms and very secure but 
expensive hardware-based one-time password tokens, biometric, smartcard, and PKI systems 
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choose their identity on a case-by-case according to how and where they want to use it. In this case, 
identity results from explicit choices by the individual. Viewing identity as a capital asset, where 
identity is regarded a property that can be publicly traded means that identity will have a changing 
value over time and space, because people's valuation of their identity changes with time and social 
context. When identity is understood as property, the value of pieces (i.e. value in different contexts) 
does not equal the value of all. The third way to analyse economics of identity is as a social good 
(where the esteem and reputation of a person have economic externalities). In this case, identity is 
understood to have network effects, meaning that identity increases in economic value by its increased 
use (by companies, by people). Finally, the conventional way to understand identity is purely as a 
cost. This means that the economic value of identity is only recognized as far as it incurs costs for the 
different stakeholders (governments, companies, consumers). 
Secondly, it would be important to look more closely at how different companies are positioned along 
the value chain, and what business models they use to operate. This would entail a more detailed look 
at the activities of each company, analysing how exactly they create value, how these activities are 
linked with those of other companies, which companies and stakeholders form partnerships, and how 
and why they do it and what is the specific role that each company fulfils in the value chain. This 
would provide us with a much more detailed understanding of the dynamics of the eID market and the 
way different types of companies can work together to increase the added value of the whole value 
chain. This analysis could be combined into a look at the competitive dynamics of either the whole 
market or some segments of it: what kind of strategies and ways of operation do companies with 
similar offerings use to best address the needs of the customers and to gain a competitive advantage 
over each other? 
Thirdly, it would also be worthwhile to find out more about the role of social networking sites (SNSs) 
for the eID market. As the role of stakeholders such as Facebook, mySpace, and Google is constantly 
growing, both in terms of use of the sites and economic importance, their role both as individual 
players and as contributors to the overall eID market (how they contribute to the growth of the sector, 
how their prominent role supports smaller companies in the field, etc.) should be better understood.  
Finally, a regional-level analysis, analysing similarities and differences of the national and regional 
markets, combined with insights into the particular drivers and barriers, and respective growth rates, 
would result in a much more granular understanding of the eID market.  
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6 EID MARKET TRENDS AND FINDINGS 
6.1 Introduction 
Whether offering secure smart card based authentication, software-based credentials or PKI-based 
interoperable services, the market for eID products and services is in rapid transition. Existing and 
emerging technologies shape developments, while new applications and partnerships raise new 
opportunities. Moreover, organisational and institutional changes elicit stakeholder strategies within an 
evolving legal and regulatory framework. Not all of these developments can be monitored or predicted 
using quantitative approaches; important qualitative factors must also be considered. This section 
describes some of the key changes in eID technologies, applications and marketplace developments, 
analyses them and elaborates possible market drivers and barriers. 
6.2 Key technology and usage developments 
Relatively robust identification and authentication technologies exist and have come to support a range 
of value-added services. Still many activities take place in the exploitation and infrastructure layers as 
businesses and Members States alike intend to facilitate access to new services. Technology and usage 
developments in the eID arena can be considered as short-term (up to three years) and long-term 
(beyond three years). 
6.2.1 Short-term developments 
In the short term, eID technology will develop onto more robust or standardised implementations; that 
is, well-known technologies (i.e. Single-Sign-On, Public-Key-Infrastructure, smart cards) will be 
made more practical through improved product development and commercialisation. Relatively large 
companies (i.e. RSA, Verizon, Microsoft) are expected to be making most progress in the short-term. 
6.2.1.1 Greater federation 
The next three years will see an increase in use of federated technologies for eID (i.e. SUN/Oracle 
with Liberty Alliance, Microsoft with WS-Federation) as cross-enterprise applications become more 
mainstream. In addition, as trust in both the technology and the issuers grows, traditionally 
‘competing’ providers will become more willing to rely on each others’ credentials within a federated 
space. This follows a shift in emphasis from underlying eID technology to value-added services (i.e. 
consulting, marketing databases, online payment). Interoperability of existing schemes is a current 
focus for development by the likes of Kantara (3.3.2.1), which will in turn improve adoption rates. 
6.2.1.2 Embedding eID in the infrastructure 
Increasingly, eID technology is embedded either in the infrastructure (i.e. biometric access to portable 
devices) or into the broader technology infrastructure ('across the layers')87 through collaborative 
development and strategic partnerships. Organisations – such as Verisign – embedding eID into the 
infrastructure aim to deliver an integrated, holistic, service-centric product model through integration 
with key infrastructure vendors (e.g. Microsoft, Cisco, Oracle) so that own security and identity 
technologies become part of the fabric of the Internet. This is in a way a return to the origins, when 
SSL was shipped with the first Netscape browsers. However, the whole process is delayed by known 
challenges in relation to open vs. proprietary standards and organisational innovation barriers. 
                                                     
87  For instance, the case of privacy-aware eID across layers, work conducted in preparation of the FIA 2010 
event: http://security.future-internet.eu/images/c/c5/WS_3March_final_report1.pdf 
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Embedding eID technologies in the Internet and mobile 
infrastructure will be critical to the development of broader 
eID applications, which are likely to emerge as a ‘critical 
mass’ of enabled infrastructure becomes available.  
6.2.1.3 Enhanced tokens 
A current challenge for eID is credential delivery through existing tokens, mainly due to the need for 
enhanced security (i.e. RSA SecurID USB token 5.2.6, Verisign Unified Authentication 5.2.8). At 
present, where two-factor authentication is required, the user has to carry a token for each credential; 
for example, a credit card for each credit card account, or a passport, driving license, and health card 
when dealing with central government. This is inconvenient for the individual and inefficient for the 
market. This is due to lack of interoperability between ID schemes; competition between commercial 
providers (in particular financial institutions which wish to keep their logo in the customer’s wallet); 
regulatory limitations; market inertia; and perceived cost of integrating credentials. 
Technologically, existing EMV88 schemes can already handle multiple accounts per token, and it is 
probable that financial institutions in particular will wish to consolidate the number of cards issued in 
order to reduce costs. In some countries (i.e. Finland 3.1.2.3) this has already occurred (e.g. checking, 
savings and credit accounts accessible from a single token), whilst in others such as the UK this is yet 
to achieve. 
The availability of enhanced token devices that consolidate 
existing multiple tokens and offer users additional functionality 
through local card readers (or embedded equivalents) will lead 
to greater adoption of certificate-based services and the 
incorporation of two-factor authentication into a wider range of 
identity relationships. 
 
A second problem with current tokens concerns online use, away from a card reader infrastructure. 
Some countries, such as Belgium and Estonia, have built an infrastructure for the domestic use of 
smart card credentials, but this is not the case in the majority of European Member States. This has 
hindered growth and increased fraud, since where card readers are not available, users have to fall 
back on manual processes – and credit card numbers and magnetic stripes provide low-security attack 
channels for fraudsters. 
This problem may be addressed through the provision of domestic or portable smartcard readers. 
Belgium, for example, has encouraged PC manufacturers to integrate card readers into all new PCs, 
and has an accreditation logo so that vendors can demonstrate compatibility of their equipment. 
However, banks have traditionally been reluctant to foot the cost of providing readers for their 
customers; in part, this is due to the perception that customers would require a card reader per 
provider, rather than a single reader for all cards from all providers. 
One innovative solution to this is the EMUE89 approach of integrating the card reader with the card; by 
providing an embedded PIN reader in a card that has multiple wallets (the card can store ten different 
credentials), it is possible to offer high-value authentication across multiple credentials from a single 
trusted device. The card can also generate challenge/response codes as dynamic passwords where 
required. 
                                                     
88  http://www.emvco.com/  
89  http://www.emue.com/site/home.htm  
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6.2.1.4 Portability of credentials 
There are various examples of credential use, typically in the banking/financial services area as well as 
in the public sector (see examples quoted in section with brief country reports 3.1). However, 
following the Belgian and Estonian examples, the next three years will see increasing use of ‘portable’ 
or hybrid credentials in both public and private sector eID schemes. Portability brings forward two 
aspects: 
• choice of delivery channels: consumers will be able to embed eID certificates in a broader 
range of devices than currently available. Rather than being constrained to a single smartcard, 
certificates will be widely embedded in multiple cards or EMUE devices, PCs, mobile phones 
or even vehicles. The likes of the BankID scheme offer this approach, but many countries lack 
this flexibility. The Estonian eID scheme even provides a real-time counter of the number of 
certificates downloaded.90 Portability of both public and private sector credentials onto mobile 
platforms will be particularly well received as smart phones are personalised for diverse 
service offerings. With security standards improving, acceptance of such systems will be 
mainly an issue of trust. 
• alternative authentication channels: where existing smartcard-based schemes suffer fraud, 
particularly in cardholder not present transactions, one effective solution is to use a separate 
channel for the authentication process. For example, a credit card number may be presented 
for an Internet transaction, but the authentication is done via a challenge/response over SMS to 
the cardholder’s registered mobile telephone number. The hybrid use of channels creates an 
additional layer of security, since an attacker has to intercept two channels to successfully 
attack the transaction. 
Increased portability of credentials and use of alternative 
authentication channels would result in a higher take-up and 
more extensive use of eID solutions, thus contributing to 
market growth. 
6.2.1.5  ‘Zero-proof’ eID 
Microsoft’s acquisition of Credentica91 and its U-Prove eID technology ought to be mentioned as a 
development in eID. U-Prove allows asserting parties to verify personal information with relying 
parties without actually revealing information; and where information is revealed, it cannot be used for 
onward purposes without the asserting party’s consent. Even where relying parties collude, there is no 
mechanism for them to undermine the asserting party’s privacy. Microsoft is now integrating U-Prove 
into Windows and Infocards, and as it becomes increasingly available on the desktop it is likely that 
providers will exploit the toolkit and build commercial implementations. 
6.2.2 Long-term developments 
In the longer term (three years and beyond), key technology developments will come from improved 
use of identity credentials. 
6.2.2.1 Governments accepting commercial credentials 
In general, governments/public authorities do not accept commercial credentials as sole identifiers 
when authenticating individuals and instead rely on proprietary sources; while a range of commercial 
breeder documents (e.g. utility bills) are used to make a risk judgement on identity, they are not used 
as the sole credential. Conversely, commercial providers will generally trust government-issued 
credentials even if these are used out of context – a passport is not designed for opening a bank 
account, but will be accepted for doing so. 
                                                     
90  http://www.id.ee/ 
91  http://www.credentica.com/ 
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A centrally-regulated framework to provide identity assurance 
for government use of commercial credentials both within and 
between European Member States would promote eID 
interoperability and create new eID market opportunities. 
 
However, as private sector providers issue more trusted credentials, and there is greater 
interoperability between private and public sector schemes both within and between nations, 
governments are increasingly likely to accept commercially-issued or foreign credentials, with less 
dependence upon their own issued documents. This will create new market opportunities for 
commercial providers as their services move into high-value and cross border use cases. The existence 
of an appropriate common legal/regulatory framework in all Member States would help in the use of 
intra-operable credentials which would, as mentioned, facilitate further market take-up of advance 
services. 
6.2.2.2 Tighter integration with mobile telecoms 
A critical move in the acceptance of eID has been the provision of portability of identity between 
platforms: the ability to embed a certificate in multiple devices to facilitate use over different channels 
(6.2.1.4). For example, a user logs on to their online banking from an Internet café; the bank uses SMS 
to send a challenge code to the user’s registered mobile phone. The user enters the number, and a PIN, 
into a trusted application on the handset which generates a response to the bank, and a one-time PIN 
for the user to enter into the PC. The bank can then authorise the login. As eID implementations 
become more interoperable and tightly integrated, mobile telecommunication providers will take on 
roles of greater importance. 
Use of mobile alternative authentication channels would 
promote eID interoperability, user convenience and security. 
For this to happen telecommunications standardisation 
bodies and industry regulators across Europe could work 
closely with mobile telecoms on rollout of interoperable 
digital certificates. 
 
Those countries such as Belgium and Estonia that have delivered portability in national eID schemes 
have benefitted from embedding certificates in mobile devices. New developments include those by 
Vodafone and Gemalto92 which have proven the concept of embedded certificates. But the next stage 
will be to fully integrate certificates into the device’s SIM card. This will permit high-value 
authentication of the device – and therefore the user – and provide an infrastructure that can support 
beyond e-Banking, e-Voting, Telemedicine and other critical services. In addition, portable credentials 
on mobile tokens reduce the risk of identity theft as there are no high risk, centralized repositories of 
personal identity information; they also deter social engineering attacks as they would have to be 
executed one by one and thus can not be automated. 
6.2.2.3 Acceptance of biometrics 
To date, biometric authentication technologies have not achieved much penetration of commercial 
markets. This is due to multiple factors: high cost of biometric infrastructure provision, historic 
concerns about the reliability of enrolment and authentication and cultural acceptability. 
Enhanced biometric technologies that are portable and 
affordable would encourage widespread adoption of 3-factor 
authentication and help to address phishing and impersonation 
attacks. 
                                                     
92  http://www.betavine.net/bvportal/home.html 
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However, recent developments have pointed the way for a much more widespread implementation of 
biometric technologies: 
• Continued falling prices of biometric readers, coupled with improved usability and reduced 
size of equipment, are making the technology more attractive for commercial use. 
• Increasing reliability of biometric readers (in particular fingerprint); mass trials and 
implementations mean that the false accept / false reject rates are much more clearly 
understood. Thus systems can be designed with a proper understanding of the consequences of 
failures, and where these occur, more reliable technologies can be introduced.  
• Untraceable biometrics93 and biometric encryption techniques are delivering privacy-friendly 
biometric systems that are more likely to gain trust and widespread public acceptance, moving 
public attitudes from ‘Big Brother’ towards a less intrusive and more socially acceptable 
technology medium. 
6.2.3 The impact of virtualisation and cloud computing 
Possibly, the most significant influence on the eID market will be the growth in virtualisation and 
cloud computing. Virtualisation – including virtualisation of the data centre and of the broader 
infrastructure, as well as of individual machines and processes – can be thought of as the ‘entrance’ to 
cloud computing. If security, identity and privacy controls are integrated into the virtual machine, then 
the physical or logical location of that device becomes irrelevant from a trust perspective.  
Virtualisation/cloud computing eID ‘nodes’ require 
technology-specific operation and protection (since all 
security effectively moves to the end-point in this model), 
and new management tools and licensing models even 
where existing technologies and products are used. 
 
Cloud computing – which implies moving storage and processing into a fully virtualised and often 
outsourced infrastructure – takes virtualisation challenges to the next level. In many cases an 
organisation will not be aware of the physical location of critical information assets, including identity 
data, when they are in the ‘cloud’. Whilst this delivers compelling cost-savings, it also gives rise to 
concerns about possible security and integrity problems. Once again, existing technologies are finding 
new growth channels through the provision of management tools and licensing models. 
In addition to provision of existing eID services when systems are virtualised or moved into a cloud 
computing model, this movement creates the opportunity for virtualisation of eID services themselves 
– that is, provision of eID to organisations or communities through a fully-outsourced service that can 
bind together the organisation’s infrastructure without being present within that infrastructure. 
Whilst deliverable with existing technologies, the challenge 
for vendors will be to convince clients that an outsourced 
eID infrastructure can be trusted: this has long been a 
challenge for vendors when selling other security 
outsourcing services. 
6.3 Emerging eID applications 
Beyond technological developments, opportunities are created in the market that aim to satisfy actual 
and latent demands. As a result numerous, novel eID applications are being developed and tested. 
While most relate to the provision of enhanced security identity services and online fraud prevention, 
new services related to online payments and credit management are also making progress, such as 
                                                     
93  http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/untraceable-be.pdf  
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services offered by US-based Paypal94 and Equifax. The availability of cross-border and cross-sector 
interoperable infrastructure will no doubt aid new applications' development and diffusion. 
Developing embedded applications, hiding the security complexity in the underlying infrastructure 
(i.e. smart card readers on PCs that can read multiple vendor cards) are a way of promoting innovation 
in eID applications. More sophisticated applications, for instance those providing access to marketing 
databases95, or those that allow a 'plug-and-play' approach with several eID components combined to 
offer a personalised customer experience are yet enriching the market. Finally, additional 'soft' 
applications/services offered by specialist partners that combine focused technical solutions with 
expert advice as to how to use them to make most of their benefits, could also enrich the market. 
While most emerging applications are in the 'services to businesses' segment, it is expected that many 
new applications will emerge in the 'services to individuals' segment, where users are likely to be the 
main innovation motor for their development96. 
6.3.1 Social media and self-assertion 
A dominant trend is the growth of eID systems based on ‘user’-driven or ‘self-asserted’ identities, 
particularly those used in social media. Individuals’ Facebook Connect, Googlemail and eBay 
credentials are becoming as important to them as government-issued documents. Self-assertion 
regards: 
• credentials: e.g. I-names,97 OpenID,98 domain names, email accounts; 
• personae: e.g. Facebook, LinkedIn, chi.mp; 
• attributes: e.g. Volunteered Personal Information (VPI) / Vendor Relationship Management 
(VRM). 
The Internet is moving towards a model where users depend less upon trusted service providers and 
build up their own peer-to-peer relationships, often based upon self-asserted or reputation-based 
credentials. These multi-party relationships are much harder to define and classify than ‘traditional’ 
two-party trust relationships and there are questions about whether basic ID concepts – such as those 
discussed – remain valid in this case. 
Self-asserted credentials are gaining significant public 
trust and adoption, and must be taken into account in any 
eID interoperability consideration. 
 
The growth in self-asserted ID gives rise to key questions such as: ‘what is an identity?’; ‘does it have 
to depend on a trusted third party or a credential issuer?’; ‘how do identities, personae and attributes 
relate to each other?’; ‘do one person's different personae actually have to be consistent?’ These are 
issues that must be addressed if the role of self-assertion is to be properly understood in the eID 
model. 
6.3.1.1 OpenID 
OpenID is probably the most successful self-asserted cross-provider eID scheme in use today. Created 
and managed by the open source community, the scheme provides a federated eID for use across 
multiple relying parties, which trust assertions from OpenID rather than requiring a relationship with 
the end user. This in turn allows users to access new participating services without having to register 
                                                     
94  PayPal offers online payment services on top of secure eID service provision by Verisign and Equifax offers 
Credit management services also secured by Verisign. 
95  Acxiom is an interactive marketing services company. 
96  Alluding to a possible customer relations management in a user-to-user environment. 
97  http://www.inames.net/  
98  http://openid.net/  
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or provide additional personal information each time they wish to do so; the precise information 
revealed to a new provider remains under the user’s control. OpenID claims to have over 1bn enabled 
user accounts and over 50,000 participating websites, and already has a substantial commitment from 
key Internet companies, including the likes of Google, Yahoo, Blogger, myspace, Wordpress, Flickr, 
Orange and AOL.  
6.3.1.2 Government use of self-asserted ID 
Governments have yet to make widespread use of self-asserted ID; it is a concept that defies the tenet 
of government being the issuer of credentials of the last resort. This may be about to change: the US 
government is proposing to use OpenID as a citizen credential in ‘low assurance’, low-trust scenarios, 
leveraging existing industry solutions (the evolution path to using IDs in a higher-trust scenario is as 
yet unclear).99 Plans are as yet at a very early stage, and are being debated mainly between government 
security architects and technologists, but if they turn into an implementation, then this will clearly 
have implications for the EU eID landscape. 
Governments have yet to make widespread use of self-
asserted eID schemes, but it is likely that such approaches 
will become increasingly important in the near future. 
6.3.1.3 Volunteered Personal Information 
Not only is the basic model for trust changing, but also the way in which data is shared in trust 
relationships. The growing trend towards Volunteered Personal Information (VPI) (also known as 
Vendor Relationship Management (VRM) or Personal Information Brokerage (PIB)), in which 
individuals release information about themselves in response to requests from relying parties (as 
opposed to placing that information with those relying parties and authorising them to use it when 
required) is shifting trust models away from the concept of a ‘trusted third party’.100 Organisations are 
decreasingly seen as the authoritative source of identity/attribute data, and new models rely on trusting 
the data subject with that role. This may have an effect of disintermediation on traditional identity 
providers, but leaves an opportunity for those providers of underlying identity infrastructures that can 
accommodate these new trust models. 
Self-assertion and volunteered personal information (VPI) 
are shifting the balance of power in identity relationships 
away from traditional providers and back to data subjects. 
This will result in disintermediation for third parties who are 
no longer required, and lead to new business models for eID. 
6.4 Market developments 
The stakeholders analysed in this Report are involved in a wide variety of activities collateral to eID; 
partly, this comes as a result of the fact that eID services have a cost that few are willing to assume. A 
manner to diffuse the cost is to bundle eID with other complimentary but more lucrative services, such 
as security, anti-fraud, or to embedded in the infrastructure; both ways are considered as necessary for 
the further development of an eID market. Consequently, the eID market relies heavily on the 
information security market for its development, and many of the key organisations and technologies 
originate from the information security industry. Such offerings include both ‘traditional’ vertical 
technology solutions (security as a ‘bolt on’ approach) and embedded solutions; for instance Verisign 
has developed strategic partnerships with other vendors to deliver an integrated, holistic, service-
                                                     
99  See http://www.idmanagement.gov/drilldown.cfm?action=openID_openGOV 
100  See http://kantarainitiative.org/wordpress/2009/06/iain-henderson-the-personal-data-eco-system/ 
 68 
centric product model hiding in the process their secure identity technology in the underlying 
infrastructure.  
Whilst infrastructural development supporting embedded 
eID capability is market driven, governments may be able to 
accelerate the process by providing incentives to embedded 
eID standardisation and innovation. 
 
Most of the companies identified take part in the exploitation of the eID products and services in the 
lower layers of the value chain. In the exploitation layer, many of the companies analysed offer 
identity management or antifraud services. For instance, Arcot systems (5.2.11), provides its clients 
with a risk-based Web identity fraud solution that in real-time assesses the fraud potential of every 
online transaction. What seem to be lacking are companies providing more sophisticated services that 
take existing identity infrastructures as a base and utilise them to offer novel services. Some such 
services include marketing databases by Acxiom and online payment by PayPal; other companies 
offering a particular service on top of the existing infrastructure were not encountered in the research. 
However, if the eID market is to develop into full maturity, there will be a significant need for 
sophisticated services which have a much higher added value than simple technology-based ones. 
Typically larger companies (such as Oracle, Microsoft, SAP) that have the necessary financial, 
personnel and knowledge resources to operate simultaneously in multiple segments of the value chain, 
have emerged to offer products and services there. If these companies will be able to combine their 
offerings across different segments, they may be able to create significantly higher added value than 
the sum of the constituent parts. In addition, many of the companies analysed offer full solutions that 
address discrete customer needs across the value chain, providing all necessary components required 
to offer the service. Often in these cases, the solution may be tailored case-by-case, thus creating even 
higher added value for the customer company. 
To drive the growth of the eID market, there is a need for 
more advanced eID services that take existing technologies 
as a starting point and, building on them, create novel 
services that offer a higher added value. 
 
We also note the emergence of a cluster of 'soft' services such as consultation, training, and 
management (traditionally Services to Business, according to NACE categorisation). This trend points 
to the increasing maturity of the industry: as both public and private stakeholders begin to realise the 
importance of eID solutions but do not know how to make the most of them, specialist companies that 
offer these services have emerged. A particularly common development is the coupling of 
identification solutions with professional services; by providing the technical solutions while at the 
same time offering expert advice on how to make the most of them, companies are able to make it 
significantly easier for their customers to make use of eID infrastructure in a reliable and cost-efficient 
manner. In some cases, eID companies are already partnering with each other, with each company in 
the partnership operating in the activities they are most proficient in.  
The emergence of softer services, such as consultation and 
training, has provided additional value to existing eID 
solutions; these are an important driver in keeping the 
industry on a growth path. 
 
Although many companies operate in the infrastructure layer, some important technological 
developments are not yet addressed by many. One of these developments is federated identity, which 
allows individuals and companies to utilise the same identification to access networks managed by 
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different organisations in order to conduct transactions. In this way, users can share information and 
applications with no need for separate identification for each service. While federated identity offers 
significant potential for further market growth several factors slow down its uptake. The most 
significant of these is security and privacy concerns, such as security of storage, retention period, data 
minimisation and secondary usage of data kept. There are also challenges in finding a common set of 
identity attributes (identifiers) for federated identities, i.e. attributes that are suitable for the purposes 
of all the stakeholders taking part in the federated identity scheme. Finally, many of today's federated 
identity schemes seem to be limited to web services, and do not allow access to proprietary services. 
The commercial availability of federated eID solutions – 
shared and trusted by both private and public actors – will 
further drive market growth; however, it will require 
addressing security and privacy concerns. 
 
Another significant development in the infrastructure section is the portability of credentials. 
Particularly important in this sense are governments accepting commercial credentials and their 
portability into the mobile sector. These developments would make it possible for companies to offer 
the same product or service for a wider market, thus significantly improving the potential of the 
business case. However, so far there are limited possibilities for companies to offer interoperable eID 
solutions. While some companies such as BankID and BBS offer solutions that are accepted for 
certain purposes by governments, in general they are very wary of accepting commercial credentials 
and instead prefer to rely on in-house solutions. As the security standards of the commercial products 
are constantly improving, it may be that this lack of acceptance is more of an issue of perceived 
suitability of commercial credential for governmental purposes. In some cases there may also be issues 
of trust. 
Another element in the landscape is the limited number of states in Europe that rely on interoperable 
infrastructure, which may mean that identities accepted by some governments may not be accepted by 
others. This reduces the incentives for the private sector to provide such interoperable solutions for 
governments. As for the mobile sector, currently there is little evidence of mobile phone services using 
electronic identities from other sources, despite the significant potential of the market. As of today, 
developments in this area seem to be limited to patents and pilots, and there may be questions as to the 
technological maturity of these solutions. 
Those markets that have yet to adopt greater portability of 
credentials should be encouraged to do so through provision of 
appropriate Certificate Authorities, permitted use of 
government root certificates, and regulations to permit 
certificate use in mobile devices.  
 
Specific solutions for single sign-on, public key infrastructures and smart card equipment are already 
offered by many companies. One of the most significant technological developments of late, cloud 
computing, is being widely discussed at the moment, but not many companies operate in the field yet. 
For example, none of the stakeholders included in the primary analysis was active in this segment. It 
can be expected that cloud computing emerges as a significant sector of the eID market in the coming 
years. Currently, however, 'Identity as a Service' is in an infant state with players such as Zimory101 or 
CloudSigma102 starting to offer cloud computing solutions. Zimory offers more efficient data storage 
through cloud computing, and CloudSigma has only recently started to offer cloud hosting.  
                                                     
101  http://www.zimory.com/ 
102  http://www.cloudsigma.com  
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Governments remain one of the most important stakeholders in the development of the eID market. 
Government departments in most EU countries increasingly deploy eID infrastructures to make it 
possible for citizens to have digital access to services, which makes them the largest individual 
customers of eID products and services. Governments' purchasing power alone gives them a high 
influence on the direction to which the market develops, for instance as to what features are required, 
what are the acceptable standards of trust and reliability and what identification methods will be used. 
The decisions and actions taken in different governmental bodies will thus be instrumental for the 
development of the eID industry.  
Governments are in a key position to drive the 
development of the eID market, both due to their 
position as the single largest customers of eID solutions 
and their role as the regulator of the market. 
 
Furthermore, most eID solutions can at present only be used in discrete national markets, especially in 
EU27, despite the single market framework. This compartmentalisation is mainly due to the lack of a 
common legal framework defining the responsibilities and liabilities of various stakeholders 
(governments, solution providers, customer companies, citizens) using eID solutions. To unify the 
currently fragmented eID markets, it would be necessary to enable the use of a single electronic 
identity across national borders and in different use contexts, so that there would be an overarching set 
of general rules; this would promote economies of scale and customer trust in electronic identification. 
Finally, the issue of trusted service provision still reigns in the market. The Microsoft’s ‘Passport’ 
scheme is a prime example of the failure of a technically robust eID system to gain wide-spread 
adoption . Originally designed to provide an SSO to Microsoft services, including the Hotmail email 
platform, the company pitched Passport as an access tool to all online services: a definitive, centralised 
eID for the Internet. Soon, user concerns emerged about privacy and liability: fears of Microsoft’s 
ability to profile users through their web access (initially denied by the company, but subsequently 
shown to be technically possible, even if Microsoft wasn’t doing so) caused protests, and providers 
backed away from trusting a service that did not offer any practical solution to perceived problems in 
the event of failure. 
For an eID scheme to succeed, the provider must deal with 
likely abuse or misuse issues even if these are not a result of 
poor product development and thus raise the trust of all 
parties in the relationship. 
 
Microsoft eventually pared Passport back to access to the company’s own services (Hotmail and 
online support), and the lesson spurred their investment in Infocard technologies, including the 
development of the ‘Laws of Identity’103 which include specifications that identity providers must not 
themselves become ‘inappropriate third parties’ in an identity relationship. 
6.5 Catalysts and barriers to market growth 
Although quantitative statistics as to market size were not found, there is a strong belief that the eID 
market is growing; anecdotal evidence refers to an increasing number of organisations entering the 
marketplace. One vendor indicated that the problem is defining what the eID market really is; since 
there is no standard accepted definition, different vendors and analysts calculate market size (and 
therefore growth) in different ways. However, that particular vendor was confident that even in the 
recession, growth exceeds 10% year on year. 
                                                     
103  http://www.identityblog.com/stories/2004/12/09/thelaws.html  
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6.5.1 Catalysts for growth 
The growing movement towards citizen-centric public services – that is, structuring government 
services around individual citizens and allowing them to download information and services from a 
single web portal – is driving growth in the public sector. Whilst the recession has slowed overall 
growth, it has driven procurement towards specific vertical markets: in particular, the recession has 
(anecdotally) fuelled growth in fraud, and vendors report seeing the emergence as ‘fraud as a service’: 
the provision of packaged fraud services available online. This has pushed organisations towards the 
purchase of anti-fraud tools in preference to other security/eID mechanisms. 
Vendors report major opportunities in those countries which are engaged in radical modernisation of 
their infrastructure (Estonia is an example of a country which has achieved this; Turkey one that is 
currently going through the process) where legacy approaches are abandoned and innovative eID 
solutions are adopted. In those countries where eID schemes are designed to serve the State, rather 
than a spectrum of stakeholders, and solutions incorporate legacy systems, ideas and processes (such 
as the UK), eID schemes appear to be less popular and adoption rates are disappointing. 
6.5.2 Influencing growth 
6.5.2.1 Policy innovation 
Interviewees felt that growth of the eID market will come from innovation in policies rather than in 
new technologies. In order to fight market fragmentation as a result of the private sector creating 
piecemeal schemes rather than generic, interoperable infrastructure, Governments should provide 
those components of trusted infrastructures that are too risky or costly for private sector organisations 
to develop: for example, enrolment of the population into an authentication scheme, or underwriting 
financial losses arising from use of an ID scheme. 
6.5.2.2 Federated eID 
eID market growth could be encouraged by government encouraging greater use of federated ID 
schemes across the private sector. For instance in the case that a national eID scheme provides an 
‘open’ interface for commercial exploitation (within a framework of regulation/accreditation) so that 
commercial stakeholders are encouraged to interface with the scheme rather than to develop 
proprietary ones in isolation. This could be achieved by public authorities that are willing to invest in, 
and then use, trusted federated credentials. BankID is a good example of this: by providing a trusted 
central database and underwriting the overall scheme, private companies have an infrastructure on 
which they can build trust services. Public authorities accept BankID credentials for specified 
purposes. 
6.5.2.3 Tougher regulation and enforcement 
Interviewees expressed the opinion that (with some exceptions) many EU Member States do not 
enforce sufficiently rigorously existing regulations, which would encourage the growth or operation of 
trusted eID. For instance, Directives encouraging organisations to use Privacy Enhancing 
Technologies (PETs) seem to have no mandatory requirement and no associated penalties, and are 
perceived as floundering. Moreover, Data Protection Commissioners lack, or choose not to use, the 
means and powers they need to enforce compliance with data protection regulations. The role, 
operation and powers of Data Protection Commissioners in regulating eID and ensuring a ‘level 
playing field’ across all borders and sectors is fundamental in the success of interoperable eID 
deployment. 
In the majority of cases, the only effective regulations are those that are industry-specific, for example 
PCI DSS104 or other financial regulations where the appropriate regulators are well-funded and 
                                                     
104  https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml 
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equipped with the ability to penalise non-compliance. It was also pointed out that this is not the case in 
the US, where regulators generally possess rigorous, prescriptive standards, and punitive powers to 
enforce them. 
6.5.2.4 Enhanced smart card infrastructure 
One of the challenges for growth in eID is the provision of portable access to eID certificates across 
platforms and locations: since most government eID schemes and payment cards rely on smartcard 
readers as the primary channel to access credentials, the lack of a smartcard reader infrastructure is a 
consistent problem. For example the Belgian and Estonian governments have encouraged vendors to 
embed readers in all new PCs, and have made readers available to citizens. The proliferation of 
smartcard reader devices among the citizens of these two Member States has without doubt been a key 
factor in the success of the eID schemes of these countries’, and one that should be encouraged on a 
pan-European scale.  
6.5.2.5 Dispute resolution and liability management 
One of the obstacles to eID growth has been determining who – or which organisation – is responsible 
for what happens when things go wrong. Where interoperability is established, emerge issues of 
dispute resolution (agreeing the authority that has the ultimate decision on resolving problems) and 
liability management (a legally binding framework to ensure that all parties understand who will 
recompense what level of loss arising from failures in the system). If these issues are not addressed, 
trust in interoperability will eventually be eroded as disputes grow. A central European authority to 
resolve disputes and enforce liability decisions would become a powerful force in encouraging 
interoperable eID growth. 
6.5.2.6 Public-private partnerships 
It is common sense that commercial partners are essential to ensure that large-scale deployment 
objectives are pragmatic, real stakeholder needs are considered throughout development, and that the 
cost of the programme is proportionate to the value of the deliverables. As a result, it is also common 
sense that, where governments create national eID schemes, public-private partnerships can be critical 
for their success as opposed to where eID schemes are developed by the public sector in isolation.  
6.5.3 Barriers to growth 
6.5.3.1 Unclear policy for Government adoption of eID 
On a pan-European scale, the lack of a commonly-understood authentication policy hinders eID 
growth. Private organisations are reluctant to speculatively invest in technology or infrastructure 
where there is a possibility that future government standards may select an alternative approach. In 
other words, the provision of firm and committed standards for government adoption of eID 
technologies will clear the way for greater commercial investment in eID. 
6.5.3.2 Poor government investment 
Just as government holds the key to influencing growth of eID, a lack of investment by government 
can be the greatest barrier to growth. For example, a lack of will by the UK government to implement 
high quality, remote authentication of individuals, even though that could help the provision of 
commercial eID solutions, has hindered eID growth in the UK. 
6.5.3.3 Initial cost of user enrolment 
For individual market players, one of the key barriers to growth is the up-front investment cost of 
initially enrolling individuals into eID systems in a trusted manner. This may require a face-to-face 
interview to take biometric details; checks on provided credentials; background checks with law 
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enforcement authorities or credit reference agencies; binding of payment details to the profile; and 
addition of other attributes to the user’s profile. This can be prohibitively expensive for most 
organisations, which in consequence will either refrain from entering the market, or ‘cut corners’ in 
establishing credentials, which undermines the credibility of the eID credentials further along the 
value chain as fraud enters the system. 
Governments can incentivise growth of eID usage by providing population-scale enrolment 
mechanisms (in much the way that Estonians can download certificates from their national eID) and 
thus prevent competitive/fractured approaches from commercial providers that divide investment into 
diverse schemes. However, care ought to be taken to do this in a scalable way allowing for cultural or 
regional specificities of EU27 Member States. 
6.5.3.4 Lack of business case 
The majority of eID systems in use today are specific to particular applications, communities, or 
nations. In the absence of a well-defined and accepted business case that proves the value in 
harmonisation and interoperability of eID, no organisation or government is willing to speculatively 
invest in the necessary standards and ‘pump priming’ to catalyse the eID market. For instance, banks 
often see security as a potential competitive advantage, but not nearly as important as customer 
retention: they are reluctant to share eID services with competitors for fear of losing customers. 
Governments would be well advised to identify and raise consensus on a compelling business case for 
investment in eID technologies – one which breaks down current ‘competing’ approaches – so as to 
'steer' companies towards more collaborative eID schemes.  
6.5.3.5 Usability 
Usability of eID can be a challenge, particularly in public sector implementations, where eID is often 
integrated into complex citizen-facing applications, and becomes difficult to use. This is not unique to 
eID: usability is not generally well-understood in government systems, and user experience can be 
poor, leading to a lack of confidence in eID itself. 
6.5.3.6 Over-dependence on national security needs 
In many national eID implementations, national security is the driving objective behind the business 
case: where a large initial investment is required, often without the prospect of a clear return, 
governments have used national security needs to justify the cost. From the perspective of encouraging 
adoption and interoperability, this can lead to a number of fundamental flaws in the approach, 
including addition of security features that discourage interoperability or access by other stakeholders, 
failure to provide for commercial stakeholder needs, and end-user views that eID is only for 
government interaction.  
For instance, the UK government’s own report105 into identity assurance recommended that national 
security needs should be seen as secondary in any scheme; that if the scheme is designed around end-
user requirements, then the resulting rapid adoption will deliver secondary national security benefits as 
the eID infrastructure becomes pervasive. 
6.6 Summary of tech-apps and market trends and barriers  
Recent developments in eID technologies and markets have been presented and analysed in this 
chapter, demonstrating on the one hand a wide-spread consensus on the role of eID as a lubricant 
enabling new services for citizens and on the other a systematic monetisation of users' eID related 
data. While we still need further analysis of the social dynamics of the European eID market and 
specifically more research to better understand the economics of eID, in this section we will present a 
                                                     
105  http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/identity_assurance_index.htm 
 74 
'roadmap' of eID evolution as a result of the findings presented in this chapter. The objective of this 
exercise is to identify those activities that may be used to signal a maturing market. As such this 
'roadmap' is a brief synthesis of trends, initiatives and activities that which are likely to materialise 
over the next 10 years (up to 2020106). In the next chapter we will propose a number of policy options 
that may help overcome some of the barriers. 
In essence, and presented graphically in Figure 20, the findings identified in the previous sections have 
been categorised in three areas (technology, market and policy) and over time (today, 2015, 2020) 
making up nine groups of entries. On the horizontal axis, we distinguish technology related, market 
related and policy related developments. On the vertical axis we report the three main stages of 
temporal developments, between now and 2020. A few entries cross the groups' time borders, 
indicating that: (a) the entry will take more time to develop (i.e. a common legal framework); or (b) it 
will take more time for consensus to be raised before this entry shapes the area (i.e. in the case of 
"Data Subject in control"). While the entries are neither new nor surprising, they clearly point to a 
logical evolution path into the future that is not the result of extrapolation techniques but follows 
bottom-up analysis of market activities, in view of the evolution in separate policy/regulatory, 
business/market and technology/knowledge network areas. In this fashion, the evolution towards the 
foreseen objectives is likely to occur even though the barriers are not removed at once. 
In essence, today's (2010) spectrum of activities comprises security-driven technological evolution, 
regulatory activity in harmonisation of proprietary eID systems and market activities that aim to add 
value through marrying eID systems to specific applications or infrastructure. This position may be 
interpreted as a "wait-and-see" position for the market players under the general uncertainty as a result 
of the lack of clear business models and of open standards as well as the ongoing and unresolved battle 
between security-driven and citizen-centric eID services. The lack of available data on successful 
cases only makes decision-taking more difficult, both for market players and for regulators. 
Tomorrow's (~ 2015) activities comprise services developed on top of eID embedded in the available 
infrastructure – apparently the market stakeholders envisage that all possible architectures would be 
available and that the legal/regulatory framework would be changed so as to create the necessary trust 
for broad implementation – where the efforts of the market players tend to connect eID applications to 
extend the reach of the services on offer. This position may be interpreted as "feel the environment" 
when market players make use of the 'trusted' eID-enabled access but explore and test the applications 
since the market is not deemed mature yet. At this stage, there will be a degree of opening of 
government-related services to industry-managed and individual managed credentials, and an 
increasing degree of open co-ordination of commercial schemes.  
Further developments (~ 2020) will completely hide eID requirements in terms of tools an 
technologies; these will be both embedded and bundled and, in essence, eID will become a service. 
Such identity-layer services will be, naturally or by intervention of he policy-maker, independent of 
the owner of the infrastructure (functional separation, as is the case with most physical network 
operations) and the emphasis will be in adding value to the services on offer. This will be so much so 
that the public sector may not only intermediate to safeguard sensitive personal data but also use them 
to offer rich content services, in a sheltered, regulated setting.  
                                                     
106  Market stakeholders interviewed considered that a 10 year span is adequate for all these changes to occur. 
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Figure 20: Road Map of eID evolution in Technological, Market and Policy areas 
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By then, the market would be sufficiently mature for eID to be considered as 'plumbing' by all 
stakeholders involved; eID-enabled access will be highly interoperable and sufficiently based on 
sufficiently open open-standards so as to support innovation and competition in added-value services. 
In Figure 21, the gist of activities pertaining to each group is defined by a brief, descriptive title. Also 
represented in the same graph are the barriers to the development of the eID ecosystems which have 
been examined in the previous sections. 
Figure 21: Road Map including Barriers 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the analysis of the evolution foreseen in the Road Map, we draw a number of general 
conclusions:  
1. The portability of credentials, both amongst and between public and business players, and the 
development of a wide choice of channels for delivering eID would facilitate the embedding 
of eID into the existing infrastructure.  
2. Further development of biometrics would enable 3-factor authentication, which in turn could 
a) ease the evolution from security-driven to citizen-centric eID and b) enhance trust so as to 
facilitate the transition to eID as a service.  
3. As market stakeholders are in stand-by mode in relation to what infrastructure eID would be 
embedded in, much more should be done to try-out federating processes and embedding eID 
into applications using open standards. More information on successful business cases should 
be circulated freely to enable the use of eID across contexts and public/private sectors.  
4. While we cannot predict the future evolution towards an eID-enabled centrally overseen, 
public infrastructure and/or an affordable and trusted private sector eID-enabled, cloud 
infrastructure, the role of Government both as a legislator and as a promoter of open standards, 
(including its power as a first buyer of eID services), should be further explored.  
5. Finally, in all circumstances, more needs to be done to promote the wider use of existing 
standards and to oversee the implementation of the embedding of eID in the infrastructure, as 
well as to offer a solution to the problem of user enrolment, currently a costly and safety-
dependent procedure. 
Drawing on the findings on the European eID market and innovation dynamics, a set of 
recommendations are presented below, that aim to promote the development of a mature, integrated 
EU27-wide eID ecosystem. 
7.1 eID governance 
Three main policy-related barriers are limiting the growth of the eID market. First, there is a lack of 
suitable standards for interoperable eID, meaning that personal identity data and electronic identities 
are unlikely to be technically usable. Even if these standards existed, it is unlikely they would be used 
in practice across borders. Second, as eID objectives vary between EU Member States, market 
development cannot be steered uniformly, thus potentially resulting in Member States policies and 
practices with conflicting aims. Third, there is hardly any trusted, consistent eID market data upon 
which governments can base their policy and organisations make decisions to invest in eID. Therefore, 
a coordinated pan-European approach to the development of a harmonious eID environment requires 
Member States and the European Commission to work together to 
• raise consensus on standards: commit to consistent technology, application and policy 
approaches for government adoption of eID so as to promote interoperability across national 
boundaries and thus incentivise commercial investment in eID; 
• harmonise objectives: raise consensus on shared objectives for eID schemes so that the 
systems delivered are not in fundamental conflict; in particular, national security should not be 
relied on as a key driver but treated as a secondary, measurable benefit. Relying mainly on 
national security generates fundamental design conflicts between schemes built around 
national security, and those built around citizen-centric services; 
• collect, harmonise and make available information: develop and make publicly available 
authoritative data about eID markets to support commercial decision-making processes. This 
 78 
could be accompanied by business case models to help justify investment and break down 
competitive barriers. 
7.2 eID regulation layer 
First, there are significant inequalities in regulatory approaches to eID across the EU27. Different 
countries apply different principles and methods in regulating their eID environment, making the 
business operating environment in the EU27 very varied. Often, this means it is difficult for 
companies to operate in multiple markets. Second, because of the current lack of a central authority in 
Europe for eID issues, there is no standard approach to matters such as cross-border use of identities, 
which hampers a more widespread adoption of eID services. Third, as there is a tendency towards 
proprietary, rather than interoperable national eID schemes, there is no commonly shared 
understanding of how national eID schemes should function. This also limits the possibilities of using 
national identities across national borders. Fourth, significant variations between eID standards in use 
across Europe mean that, even from a technological standpoint, the various eID solutions may not be 
compatible. For eID interoperability to succeed, regulatory bodies will need to provide a ‘level playing 
field’ across participating countries, and in particular prepare: 
• regulatory parity: seek greater parity in the role, operation and powers of Data Protection 
Commissioners (or equivalent authorities) to supervise enforcement of eID; 
• centralised leadership: establish a central European authority to manage interoperability, 
resolve disputes and enforce liability decisions between national ID schemes and, potentially, 
commercial schemes as well; 
• interoperable government eID: European nations should prioritise greater interoperability of 
government-issued credentials, both inside and outside Europe; 
• standardisation: work with relevant standards bodies to promote harmonisation of eID 
technology and infrastructure approaches. 
7.3 eID technology layer 
First, better end-user tokens that can handle multiple operating environments and use cases are needed. 
Currently, existing technologies may not be sufficiently versatile to support the variety of emerging 
eID services that may require particular, granular functionalities. Second, in order to improve 
credential portability, the ideal would be for consumers to be able to store their personal identity data 
in a device other than a smartcard. Third, there is a need for pervasive and portable biometric 
technologies to fight the growing risk of identity-related fraud. 
Whilst there is no specific need for government intervention to develop new eID technologies, and 
citizens are not calling for greater use of biometrics at this time, certain technologies should be 
encouraged to promote eID growth, including: 
• enhanced tokens: providing tokens that can consolidate multiple tokens and functions, or 
incorporate card reader/PIN technologies to promote use of dynamic passwords and two-factor 
authentication; 
• certificate portability: allowing portable or multiple certificates so that they are not embedded 
solely in a smart card, but rather in the secure token of the user’s choice; 
• improved biometrics: enhanced biometric technologies that are portable and affordable would 
encourage widespread adoption of 3-factor authentication where needed and help to address 
phishing and impersonation attacks. 
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7.4 eID infrastructure layer 
Governments can incentivise growth of eID usage by undertaking functions and supplying elements 
that are deemed too risky or costly for the private sector to develop (such as initial enrolment of 
individuals). thus preventing fragmentation of approaches. This would also provide an easy way for 
citizens to start using new eID based services in a variety of use cases. In this context, there is a need 
to incorporate eID technologies into other products and services so as to create a ‘critical mass’ of 
infrastructure based on the possibility of reaching a greater user base for a multiplicity of eID-enabled 
services. 
In addition, the provision of and support for pervasive smartcard interface technologies could facilitate 
portable access to eID certificates across platforms and locations, ensuring enhanced access to 
credentials. There is also a need for greater use of federated database technologies to improve 
interoperability, as many eID developments tend to be limited in scope to a single country or an 
individual sector or application. Finally, there is a significant lack of trust between commercial eID 
initiatives, witness the existing wide variety of incompatible commercial solutions that enjoy only 
limited user trust.. The nurturing of an interoperable eID infrastructure which will in turn promote eID 
commercial exploitation can be achieved through: 
• user enrolment : centralised or coordinated enrolment of users into authentication schemes 
would incentivise smaller innovative businesses to enter the market while ensuring credibility 
of eID credentials thus collected further, also along the value chain as fraud enters the system; 
• embedding eID: governments may be able to accelerate eID development by incentivising key 
vendors to embed standardised eID mechanisms into their products; 
• promoting federation: greater use of federated ID schemes across the private sector could be 
encouraged by governments if in turn public authorities would declare to be willing to use, 
trusted federated credentials. 
7.5 eID exploitation / services layer 
Actual public-sector eID schemes are quite inflexible and do not allow for new developments to 
emerge from outside the current paradigm. On the other hand, there is a requirement for open access to 
eID schemes by industry via open standards, and greater collaboration between public and private 
stakeholders. In view of these requirements and given the key position of governments to influence 
eID developments, a higher degree of cooperation between industry and government departments 
would be a positive development. Such cooperation could result in:  
• innovative approaches: public authorities in particular should embrace innovative eID models 
that incorporate self-asserted credentials and volunteered personal information (VPI) models; 
• open interfaces: government eID schemes should provide open access for industry to utilise 
public systems (with or without incurring licensing fees), and support that use by encouraging 
a range of Certification Authorities to grow around government schemes; 
• public-private partnership: governments should work with commercial partners to ensure that 
objectives are pragmatic; that stakeholder needs are considered throughout development; and 
that the cost of the programme is proportionate to the value of the deliverables. 
7.6 eID research 
Finally, while the expectations of the eID market stakeholders we reported may never materialise, 
continued research of the European eID market and more reliable quantitative and qualitative 
information are needed, so as to be able to support evidence-based decision making. A first issue to 
consider is the availability of authoritative data on eID markets. During our research, interviewees 
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referred to analysts’ reports on eID, indicating a preference for Gartner107 and IDC108 as the most 
credible sources. However, commercial organisations tend to rely on their own internal research and 
instincts – largely driven by customer opportunity – to inform their decision making. In some cases 
qualitative information is of greater value than quantitative information – vendors will consider the 
nature of a chain of trust to identify commercial opportunities. They may tend to privilege vendor-
customer tactics and equilibria, rather that looking at general market welfare and, even less, social 
welfare. Legitimately, interviewees reported developing their own business cases for eID initiatives, 
rather than relying upon external information. In this light, there is a clear need for extensive, 
independent and authoritative data on eID markets, to be collected through a methodologically 
appropriate and transparent process, and made publicly available so as to support commercial and 
public decision-making processes. A final issue, in relation to the previous, is that of adequately 
publicising and diffusing the existing consensus on the state of the eID market. Public private 
collaboration and partnership, assisted by EU institutions, chiefly the European Commission, will be 
needed to develop measures to achieve this objective. 
                                                     
107  http://www.gartner.com/ 
108  http://www.idc.com/ 
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